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Case No. 20150154-CA
INTHE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff!Appellee,

v.
SANTIAGO APONTE.,

Defendant/Appellant.
Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Defendant appeals from convictions for failing to respond to an
officer's signal to stop, a third degree felony; failing to stop at an accident
involving injury, a class A misdemeanor; and reckless driving, a class B
misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2015).
INTRODUCTION

Aponte led officers on a high-speed chase through well-trafficked city
streets, speeding past at least two stop signs. The pursuing officer reached
speeds of over 75 miles per hour h-ying to catch up to the fleeing vehicle
before he abandoned the pursuit for the c01nmunity's safety.

Aponte

eluded the officer only briefly before striking a curb, going airborne, and
crashing into a convenience store's cement pillar near gas pumps. The pillar

stopped him from striking a man who stood behind it. Witnesses watched
Aponte struggle with his deployed airbag, exit the vehicle, run to an eightfoot fence, and scale it. Aponte' s passenger, however, remained behind.
She injured her knee in the crash.

When officers arrived shortly after

Aponte fled on foot, she told them he was the driver.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

Issue 1. In an "extremely" well-lit area, two eyewitnesses watched

Aponte intently and with an unobstructed view as he struggled with a
deployed airbag, climbed out of the crashed vehicle, ran towards them, and
fled. After officers arrived and got Aponte' s name from his abandoned and
injured passenger, they pulled Aponte's photo from their records and
showed it to the two eyewitnesses.

Both identified the man in the

photograph as the driver who had fled. Using that information, officers
established a perimeter around the gas station to locate Aponte.

Ten

months later, the same eyewitnesses independently identified Aponte in a
photo array.

Officers used a different photograph of Aponte than was

shown to witnesses the night of the crash and placed it in an array of five
other individuals with similar characteristics. Both eyewitnesses were 99%
certain Aponte was the driver. One "immediately" recognized him.
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Did the trial court en~ when it denied Aponte's motion to suppress
identification testimony from the two eyewitnesses?
Standard of Review. When reviewing a trial court's decision admitting
identification testimony, this Court defers .., to the trial court's fact-findil.1.g
role by viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the b·ial court's
decision."

State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991).

It reverses

"factual findings only if they are against the clear weight of the evidence."

Id.

The trial court's ultimate determination that the facts "demonstrate

reliability" is reviewed for correctness. Id.
Issue 2. Before trial, the State 1noved to admit two of Aponte' s other

convictions for fleeing officers in a vehicle. The first flight occurred about a
year before the gas station crash. The second occurred only weeks after the
crash. While Aponte opposed the State's motion, he argued only that the
evidence was unduly prejudicial-an argument he has abandoned on
appeal. He at no point objected that the non-character purposes advanced
by the State, and those ultin1ately accepted by the trial court in its ruling,
were improper uses for the evidence. He conceded that at least one of the
purposes was proper.

When the parties were finalizing the 404(b)

instruction to send to the jury, Aponte again did not object that any of the
State's proposed purposes were improper.
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Should this Court address Aponte's unpreserved argument that the trial
court relied on invalid non-character purposes when admitting his other
convictions for fleeing?
Standard of Review.

No standard of review applies.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) ("Crimes, Wrongs, or Other Acts")
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

When officers tried to pull over a Chevy Impala that was suspected
stolen, the driver began straddling a fog line separating his lane frmn the
road's shoulder, but he did not slow down. R328:136-37. The driver then
made a sudden left turn and accelerated past a stop sign and through a busy
intersection. R328:137-39. Officers travelled in excess of 75 miles per hour
to catch up to the Impala, but eventually abandoned the chase for the
public's safety. R328:139-40.
The driver eluded officers only briefly before his Impala hit a curb,
flew through the air, and crashed into a cement pillar at a Hart's gas station.
R325:6; R328:140-42,169,186.

But for the cen1ent pillar, the Impala would

likely have sh·uck a man standing near his parked car at the gas pumps.
R328:144-45; State's Exs. 2,3. Even after hitting the pillar, the Impala sh·uck
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and dented another vehicle that was parked at a gas pump and had two
occupants inside of it. R328:143,187-88,191; State's Exs. 2,3.
The driver of the crashed Impala fled on foot. But the passenger,
Rebecca Robertson, remained at Hart's. R328:143,145. She injured her knee
in the crash.

R328:123,145.

She told responding officers that Santiago

Aponte was the driver and gave a brief description of him. R328:146. Using
that information, officers established a perimeter and pulled a digital
photograph of Aponte from their records. R328:113-14,147-48.
Officers showed an enlarge1nent of the photograph to Eileen Miller
and Warren Smith, two Hart's customers who had seen the driver crash and
flee on foot.

R325:36-37; R328:148. They both identified the man in the

photograph as the driver who had fled and reported getting a good look at
him from a close distance, both while he was struggling to exit the crashed
Impala and while he was running from the scene. R102; R328:173-76. Both
witnesses later testified that the lighting at Hart's was "really bright."
R328:170,185.
Officers searched the stolen Impala and found a license plate
registered to another Chevy Impala that was "very shnilar" to the stolen
vehicle. R328:150; State's ex. 4. Aponte was not the registered owner of that
Impala either. Id.
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The State charged Aponte with theft by receiving stolen property, a
second degree felony; failing to respond to an officer's signal to stop, a third
degree felony; failing to stop at an accident involving injury, a class A
misdemeanor; reckless driving, a class B misdemeanor; theft by receiving
stolen property, a class B misdemeanor; and driving on a suspended or
revoked license, a class C misdemeanor. R9-7.
Several months later, Miller and Smith identified Aponte in a photo
array with 99% certainty that he was the man who crashed and fled from
Hart's on foot. R325:20,29-30; R328:158-59; State's Ex. 6. Officers used a
different photograph of Aponte than they showed Miller and Smith the
night of the crash and chose five other 1nen for the array who had facial
features similar to Aponte's. R328:158-160.
Aponte moved to suppress Miller's and Smith's identifications both at
the crash scene and at the photo array. RS0-45. Following a suppression
hearing where Miller and Smith testified, the trial court denied Aponte' s
G

1notion. R102-96 (Addendum A).
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Before trial, the State moved to ad1nit evidence of Aponte' s two other
convictions for fleeing from officers in a vehicle. R121-114. The trial court
granted the State's motion. 1 R327:13-14 (Addendum B).
Aponte did not appear for his trial, and the State tried him in absentia.
R328:84-86,100. 2 The jury heard that Miller and Smith identified Aponte as
the driver at the crash scene and the subsequent photo array. R328:177,192.
And both witnesses testified at trial that they were 99% certain they had
identified the driver. Id. Robertson also testified that Aponte was the driver
of the car in which she was the passenger. R328:121-22.
The jury also heard of Aponte's two other attempts to flee from police
by driving so recklessly that officers had to abandon their chase for the
public's safety. The first chase, which occurred a year before the Hart's
incident, also ended in Aponte crashing his vehicle and apparently trying to
flee on foot. R328:209. The other chase, which occurred only weeks after

1

The State provides additional facts and proceedings regarding the
Aponte's suppression motion and the State's rule 404(b) motion in the
Argu1nent section, below.
2

Aponte did not appear for the last pretrial conference either.
R328:85. The judge issued a no-bail warrant for Aponte' s arrest before trial.
R327:22. The prosecutor tried to locate Aponte during the days leading up
to h·ial but reported that Aponte could not be found at the jails or hospitals.
Id. At trial, the h·ial judge determined that Aponte had "voluntarily
absented hiinself and waived his right to be at trial." Id.
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the Hart's incident, involved both another passenger who later identified
Aponte to police and a subsequent photo'.""array identification. R328:209-10.
The jury convicted Aponte of failure to respond to an officer's signal
to stop, failure to stop at an accident involving injury, reckless driving, and
driving on a suspended or revoked license. R291-90. The jury acquitted
Aponte of theft by receiving stolen property. Id. The trial court sentenced
him to a zero-to-five year prison term. R306-05.
Aponte timely appeals. R314.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Point I.

Aponte argues that the trial court erred in admitting

identification testhnony fron1 two eyewitnesses who watched him crash and
flee from a gas station. He argues that the eyewitnesses' initial view of a
single photo of Aponte was impermissibly suggestive and that it tainted the
subsequent photo array.

He also independently challenges the array,

"'

arguing that it was impermissibly suggestive and umeliable.
Q

Aponte

identifies

identification procedures.

nothing

unnecessarily

suggestive

in

the

Investigating officers' initial use of a single

photograph was necessary to identify a suspect that was still at large.
Because time was of the essence in establishing a perimeter around the gas
station, cmnpiling a photo array would have lost officers the opportunity of
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locating a suspect engaged in a reckless spree.

Indeed, neither set of

identifications was the product of suggestion.

Rather, both witnesses

approached officers with a clear, recent memory of the fleeing driver and
were confident they could identify him. In any event, the ten-month period
between the initial photo identification and the photo array attenuated any
trace of suggestiveness.
The photo array itself was also not suggestive, much less
unnecessarily so.

Both witnesses identified Aponte in the array with 99%

certainty. One of them identified the driver "immediately." Officers used a
different photo of Aponte than the one shown to witnesses the night of the
crash. And the six assembled men all had light complexions; only three
were lighter than Aponte, who is Hispanic.

The trial court correctly

determined that any slight variations between Aponte's photo and others'
did not render the photo array unnecessarily suggestive. Furthermore, the
witnesses' identifications remained consistent from the night of the crash
through the photo array held ten months later, and they both confirmed at
trial that they were still 99% positive the man in the photograph was the
driver. The lack of an unnecessarily suggestive procedure in either the onscene identification or the photo array is grounds alone upon which to
affirm the h·ial court's ruling.
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In any event, the overall identification procedure well exceeded the
reliability standard set forth by the Utah Supren1e Court in State v. Rmnirez.
The eyewitnesses had a clear, unobstructed, and focused view of Aponte's
face under extremely good lighting while he struggled to exit the crashed
Impala and ran within feet of them. Each witness made eye contact with
him, and they gave corroborating accounts of his facial features and
clothing.

They both paid Aponte significant attention.

One of them

expressly recalled thinking to herself that she had better remember the
event clearly. And Aponte does not argue, nor does the record reflect, that
either witness had anything but mental acuity and sufficient perceptual
capacity to ascertain the driver.

This evidence supports that the

identifications were not the product of suggestion, but rather based on the
witnesses' recall of the driver's appearance.

Finally, any error in the

identifications was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because Aponte's
passenger consistently said that he was the driver, and she received nothing
in exchange for her trial testimony.
Point IL Aponte argues that the trial court erred by admitting his

other evasion convictions on improper non-character purposes and by not
defining those purposes in the jury instructions. He argues that the noncharacter purposes presented in the jury's li1niting instruction were not
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legitimate because, he claims, "the only contested issue was the identity of
the suspect." He faults the trial court for not providing further instruction
on the listed non-character purposes.
But Aponte did not preserve this challenge below. He never objected
to the non-character purposes advanced by the State.

He had the

opportunity to do in his opposition to the State's 404(b) motion and as late
as when the parties were finalizing the 404(b) instruction that would go to
the jury. Because his challenge to the validity of the non-character purposes
is unpreserved, and he does not argue plain error or any other justification
for appellate review, review is precluded.
Aponte also has not shown-and cannot show-prejudice on the
remaining evidence. An officer testified that an Impala led him on a highspeed chase that he had to abandon for public safety. Aponte's passenger
identified him as the driver both at the crash scene and at trial. And two
eyewitnesses who had a clear, sustained view of hhn at the gas station
identified him as the driver on scene and in a subsequent photo array.
Aponte cannot show a reasonable likelihood of a better outcmne on this
evidence.
In any event, the challenge is meritless.

Aponte put absence of

mistake at issue during cross-exa1nination of the pursuing officer, who
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testified that he could not say with certainty that Aponte saw and heard the
police vehicle behind him. And the trial court properly allowed the State to
rely on the doctrine of chances in rebutting Aponte' s claim that his
passenger fabricated his involvement and that eyewitnesses misidentified
him.

A passenger from another high-speed chase similarly identified

Aponte as the driver and a subsequent photo array confirmed that
identification. The probability of fabrication and misidentification here was
slight.
ARGUMENT

I.
The trial court did not err in admitting identification
testimony from two eyewitnesses who saw Aponte crash a
vehicle at a gas station and flee on foot.

Aponte argues that the h·ial court erred in admitting eyewitnesses'
identifications of him as the driver who crashed near gas pumps at the
Hart's station and fled on foot. Br.Aplt.10-17. Aponte first challenges the
witnesses' on-scene identification of him in a photograph that responding
officers culled while the chase was still underway. Id. at 11-13. Aponte
argues that the officers' use of a single photo was "impermissibly
suggestive" and tainted the eyewitnesses' subsequent identification of him
in a photo array held several months later. Id. at 12-14. Aponte also argues

that the subsequent photo array was "impermissibly suggestive" on its own
-12-

because, he claims, officers led the witnesses to believe that the driver was
in the array. Id. at 13-14.
The trial court properly admitted both the on-scene and photo-array
identifications. Officers' use of a single photograph to confirm the driver's
identity was not unnecessarily suggestive because it helped them establish a
perimeter around the gas station and apprehend a suspect that was engaged
in a reckless, dangerous spree. The ten-month period between that initial
viewing and the subsequent photo array attenuated any possible
suggestiveness. And the photo array itself was not suggestive, much less
unnecessarily so.

The lack of unnecessary suggestiveness in either

procedure is grounds alone upon which to affirm. In any event, the overall
reliability of both the on-scene and photo-array identifications well
exceeded the standard set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in State v.

Ramirez, and thus outweighed any arguable suggestiveness.

A.

Proceedings below.
Aponte filed a 1notion to suppress Miller's and Smith's identifications

both at the crash scene and at the subsequent photo array. RS0-45. Aponte
argued that their initial identifications were umeliable because they had
never before seen Aponte and they were distracted by "a lot of commotion"
surrounding the car crash. Id.

He further argued that the investigation
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following the crash did not justify officers using a single photograph of
Aponte-as opposed to a photo array including others of shnilar
appearance-and that the on-scene identifications failed Utah's five-factor
test for reliability. R84-75.
Aponte argued that Miller's and Smith's subsequent identifications of
Aponte during the photo array were unreliable because they were tainted
by the initial on-scene view of Aponte' s single photograph. R59-56. Aponte
also argued that the photo array was "highly suggestive" because other
suspects in the array did not share "similar ... characteristics" with him.
R48-47. He complained that he was apparently the only Hispanic in the
array, only two of the five other suspects were bald, and he was the only
bald suspect with a goatee. R56; R326:3-4. Aponte continued that during
the subsequent photo array, "most could not identify [him] with 100%
certainty." RS0-45.
The h·ial court held a suppression hearing where Miller and Smith
testified. R325. Miller recounted her view of the collision and the driver's
flight.

She testified that after she paid the Hart's attendant and started

walking back towards her car, she saw a vehicle "hit the curb" at high speed
and go "airborne," flying about 25 feet before hitting a cement barrier in
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front of a bank of gas pumps. R325:6. The car's "nose" hit the barrier first,
"then the back of the car fell down." R325:10.
Miller stood about twenty feet from the crash.

Id.

The vehicle's

airbags had deployed, and Miller watched the driver-a man- batting his
down. Id. She saw a woman in the passenger seat. Id. Miller thought to
herself, "[T]his is a big deal, you better pay attention."

Id.

Miller was

"intently looking" at the driver to "see if [she] knew him." R325:16. She
testified that she first saw his "profile" while "he was trying to get the bag
down." Id.

Then she saw him "straight on" as he talked to the female

passenger. R325:17.
Unable to open the driver-side door, the driver rolled down his
window, climbed out of the vehicle, and ran "right in front" of Miller,
coming within "five to six feet" of her. R325:7. He wore jeans, a white tee
shirt, and "a navy blue bandana on his head, tied in the back." R325:9. He
was of "medium complexion" and "appeared to have a goatee." Id. When
the driver approached Miller, he gave her a "back off" look. R325:8. Miller
testified that Hart's had an "extre1nely well lit" pump area. R325:10,17. It
was "probably as bright" as the courtroom where she was testifying.
R325:10.

-15-

Miller followed the man around the building and watched him scale
an eight-foot barbed wire fence. Id. She watched the driver "from the time
of impact until the time he ran in front of" her. Id. This was about three
minutes.

R325:18.

She testified that her memory of the event was

"[e]xtremely strong," a "ten." R325:10.
After police responded and Miller wrote her witness statement, she
approached an officer who was showing a group of witnesses a photograph.
R325:12,13,18. Miller recognized the individual in the photograph as the

driver who had fled. R325:13,18. She later testified that the officer did not
ask her to look at the photo; rather, she" did that on [her] own as part of the
group that was looking." R325:13. Furthermore, she did not know if the
officer had asked the others to look at the photo. R325:18. She was "just
following the crowd." Id.
Warren S1nith not only saw the crash; he felt part of it. R325:22-23.
Smith sat in the passenger seat of a vehicle parked at the "middle pump"
~

facing the street. R325:23. His father-in-law sat in the driver's seat. Id.
Smith testified that a vehicle came "squealing" "right towards" theirs. Id.
(;..,
0

He told his father-in-law to "brace," believing they were getting hit.'' Id.
The impact "ended up being just a little bit of a bump" because a pole "right
next to" them took most of it. Id.
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Smith saw a male driver and female passenger in the crashed vehicle
"flailing around" with their deployed airbags. R325:24. They were about
ten feet away from S1nith. R325:32. Smith "fixed" his gaze on the driver,
who tried to get out of the vehicle and eventually climbed out through the
window "Dukes of Hazard sty le" - i.e., head first. Id. Once outside the
vehicle, the driver turned and faced Smith, "almost ran into" Smith's
vehicle, put his hand on its hood, and looked "right at" Smith as he ran by
Smith's window. R325:25,32-33. Smith made eye contact with the driver
both when he was trying to get out of the crashed vehicle and when he ran
past Smith's window. Id. Smith testified that he saw the driver's face for
about five to ten seconds. R325:33. The driver had a "short trimmed goatee,
a shaved head," and wore jeans, a white tee shirt, and a blue bandana. Id.
Hart's gas station was "really bright," and Smith had an unobstructed view
of the driver the entire time. R325:28. Smith testified, "I saw him very, very
clear." Id.
II

Smith told a responding officer that he got a really good look" at the
II

driver and that he was "confident" he could identify him easily." Id. The
officer showed him a single photograph of a man that Smith immediately
recognized as the driver.

R325:29.

When asked whether the officer

approached hiln with the photo, S1nith testified, "I believe I mentioned that

;,$
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I could identify him as we were talking about the scenario. I might have
initiated the fact that I got a really good look at hiln and could identify him

if needed." R325:33. But Smith could not reme1nber if he "initiated that" or

if the officer" initiated that part." Id.
Ten months later, officers created a photo array of six suspects,
including Aponte.

R91,102; R325:30,37.

Officers used a different
-~

photograph of Aponte than they showed witnesses the night of the crash.
R325:39-40. They compiled the array using booking photos of individuals

who had features similar to Aponte's. R325:38-39. Some of the men had
shaved heads, s01ne had a "small a1nount of facial hair," they were all
"roughly the same age," and they were all shown "with the same jail
booking photo background."
goatees, including Aponte.

Id.

R325:39; R90-88.

Three of the men had

Three witnesses to Hart's crash- Eileen

Miller, Warren Smith, and Benjamin Gunn-viewed the photo array. R9188.

Miller "immediately" selected the photograph of Aponte, placed her
initials next to it, and wrote that she was "99% certain" he was the driver.
R91,90; R325:20. Smith also selected Aponte' s photograph, initialed it, and

wrote that he was "99% positive" Aponte was the driver. R91,89; R325:2930.

Benjamin Gunn, another witness who had seen only the suspect' s
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profile "very briefly," selected two photographs, including Aponte' s.
R91,88. He was 30% certain Aponte was the driver and 70% certain another
man in the array was. Id.
The trial court denied Aponte's suppression 1notion.
(Addendum A).

R102-96

The court first determined that the eyewitnesses'

identifications of Aponte at the scene were reliable under State v. Long's
five-factor test. R101-100 (citing 721 P.2d 483, 493 (Utah 1986)). The court
found that the witnesses "each had a good look at the suspect" and were
"within 25 feet" of him in an "exh·emely well-lit" area. Rl00. Indeed, the
court noted, one witness was "within half a car length" of the suspect and
"looked right at him." Id. Both wih1esses saw him for about 30 seconds or
more. Id. And they both focused on him "with the expressed intent of
making sure they could identify him in the future."

Id. The trial court

observed that both witnesses were "very clear" in identifying Aponte at the
preliminary hearing and both said they were "mentally acute" at the scene.

Id.

Their identifications of Aponte remained "consistent" from the time

they first identified him in the photograph to the preliminary hearing. Id.
And the event was "unusual," which naturally drew their attention to the
suspect. Id. Finally, the court noted, the passenger of the stolen car-who

-19-

knew Aponte by name-corroborated the eyewitnesses' identification of
Aponte as the driver. Id.
The trial court next determined that the officer's use of Aponte's
photograph at the crash scene was reasonable '"in light of the totality of the
circumstances.

111

Id. (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383

(1968)). Officers learned from the vehicle's passenger that Aponte was the

driver.

Id. And because the driver created a risk of a "serious fire or

explosion and bystander deaths by crashing at a high speed in the area of
the gas pumps," officers were justified in verifying that Aponte was the
driver so they could "apprehend him as quickly as possible." Id.
prevented officers frmn

II

This

arresting an ilmocent suspect" and prevented

Aponte from committing "similar acts," such as "stealing another car in his
flight and again putting the public at fatal risk." Id.
And given that eyewitnesses "made a point" to scrutinize the driver's
face when he left the scene, their initial identification was unambiguous,
"strong," and did not carry an "unconstitutional risk of taint." R99. The
II

court reasoned that Aponte' s theory of the eyewitness evidence would
require virtually any prior look at a suspect to be dee1ned unreliable and an
identification-tainting occurrence." Id.
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The court next concluded, based on the Long factors, that the
eyewitnesses' identifications of Aponte in the subsequent photo array were
reliable. Id. The court noted that its rejection of Aponte's challenge to the
initial witness photo identification largely mooted his challenge to the
subsequent photo array.

Id. And the court was inclined to exclude the

photo array because it appeared to be merely cumulative of the
eyewitnesses' "much stronger" on-scene identifications. Id. The array was
not unnecessarily suggestive, in any event. Aponte, though Hispanic, had a
"fairly light" complexion. Id. While three of the men in the photo array
appeared "lighter" than Aponte, all of the1n had light complexions. R98.
And while Aponte was bald and had a goatee, three of the other men had
goatees, two had some facial hair, and four out of the five were balding. Id.
The court also noted that Aponte's photograph appeared "neither first nor
last in the group." Id. And Aponte's "wife beater" did not make him stand
out among the others who wore "a variety of shirts." Id. The court thus
granted admission of the on-scene identifications and reserved ruling on the
photo-array identifications. R98-97.
When Aponte did not appear for hAial, the State argued that the court
should allow evidence from the photo array because the witnesses would
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not be able to identify Aponte in court.

R328:88.

The court ultimately

allowed the photo-array identifications.
At trial, the jury heard that Miller and Smith identified Aponte' s
photograph both at the crash scene and at the subsequent array.
R328:177,192. They also heard that Aponte's passenger, Rebecca Robertson,
remained at the gas station and told officers that Aponte was the driver.
R328:146. She again identified Aponte as the driver at h ial. R328:121-22.
4

The jury heard that when officers interviewed Robertson at the hospital
where she was being treated for her knee injury, she was a "little
uncooperative." R328:118-19,123,145. One of the officers wrote in his report
that she "was not willing to tell the truth" during the interview. R328:118.
But the record sheds no further light on what was said during that
interview.
The jury heard that Robertson entered a guilty plea to charges
stemming from the night of the crash. R328:123-25. But she was not offered
anything for testifying in Aponte' s trial. R328:125. The jury also heard that
Robertson had

committed several felonies,

including giving

false

infonnation to a police officer. R328:124,126. When the prosecutor asked
her why she appeared hesitant to testify, she said, "Just my old ways of
thinking, you know. You don't tell on your friends. You have a loyal code,
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your friends."

R328:127.

On cross-examination, defense counsel asked,

,,.Would you give false information to protect a friend?"

R328:128.

Robertson responded, "Back in the day, yeah, I probably would, you know.
I got pretty messed up in-." Id. On redirect, she affirmed that she was
telling the truth at trial.

Id.

The jury heard that Robertson had been

subpoenaed to testify. Id.
B.

Before a reviewing court addresses the reliability of an
eyewitness identification, it must first determine whether the
identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive.
The

federal

constitution

generally

protects

defendants

from

convictions based on umeliable evidence, "not by prohibiting introduction
of the evidence, but by affording the defendant means to persuade the jury
that the evidence should be discounted as unworthy of credit." Perry v. New

Hampshire, 132 S.Ct. 716, 723 (2012) (emphasis added).

For example,

constitutional safeguards to counter unreliable evidence include "the Sixth
Amendment rights to counsel, cmnpulsory process, and confrontation plus
cross-examination of witnesses." Id. (citations omitted).
The same holds true under the Utah Constitution. Under article I,
section 12, defendants "have the right to appear and defend ... by
counsel, ... to be confronted by the witnesses against" them, and "to have
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compulsory process to c01npel the attendance of witnesses" on their behalf.
Utah Const. art. I § 12.
Typically, then, the reliability of evidence is left for the jury to test
through the crucible of trial, with all of its safeguards for determining the
truth. See Perry, 132 S.Ct. at 723. There is a rare exception-when improper
police conduct renders the evidence so umeliable that its admission can be
said to deny a defendant his due process right to a fair trial. For exa1nple,
suppression is constitutionally required when a confession prompted by
police interrogation techniques '"are so offensive to a civilized system of
justice that they must be condemned."' State v. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80,
,111, 984 P.2d 1009 (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157,163 (1986)).
Silnilarly, suppression is constitutionally required when an identification
results from a police procedure that is "unnecessarily suggestive and
conducive to irreparable mistaken identification as to deny the accused a
fair trial." State v. Mccumber, 622 P.2d 353, 357 (Utah 1985).
The United States Supreme Court has thus established a two-step test
for analyzing the admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence. Neil v.

Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 197-99 (1972). As a threshold matter, a court must
determine whether law enforcement used an "unnecessarily suggestive"
identification procedure in obtaining the out-of-court identification. Id.
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If

not, the court's due process inquiry ends.

See id.

Only when officers

employ an unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure does the court
proceed to step two-it must then determine "whether under the 'totality of
the circumstances' the identification was [sufficiently] reliable even though
the confrontation procedure [employed by officers] was suggestive." Id. at
199.
In State v. Ramirez, the Utah Supreme Court criticized the federal
model, but did not eliminate-or take issue with-the conditional two-step
federal approach.

817 P.2d 774, 780-81 (Utah 1991).

Indeed, Ramirez

nowhere suggests-and no Utah case since Ramirez has suggested-that an
eyewitness identification not prompted by official 1nisconduct implicates
state due process. Rather, Ramirez adopted a state due process standard for
II

analyzing the reliability of identifications. Id. It faulted as scientifically
unsupported" only the criteria used for judging the reliability of "arguably
suggestive eyewitness identifications" under step two of the federal test. Id.
at 779-81. 3 Ramirez required an appraisal of a suggestive identification's

3

The criteria for assessing reliability under step two of the federal
model are: "[1] the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the
time of the crime, [2] the witness' degree of attention, [3] the accuracy of the
witness' description of the criminal, [4] the level of certainty demonstrated
by the witness at the confrontation, and [5] the length of tiine between the
crime and the confrontation." Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200.
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reliability based on more refined criteria set forth in State v. Long, 721 P.2d
483 (Utah 1986):
(1) [T]he opportunity of the wib1ess to view the actor during
the event; (2) the witness's degree of attention to the actor at the
time of the event; (3) the wib1ess' s capacity to observe the
event, including his or her physical and mental acuity; (4)
whether the witness's identification was made spontaneously
and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the
product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being
observed and the likelihood that the witness would perceive,
remember and relate it correctly.

Id. at 780-781 (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493).
Although Ramirez did not take issue with the federal two-step model,
it did misapprehend the federal model in one respect. The supreme court
stated that the element of "suggestibility" included in the fourth Long factor
has "no comparable emphasis given to [it] by Biggers." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at
781. But that is incorrect. Long's "suggestibility" inquiry is, in fact, the
focus of step one under the federal due process model and the subject
against which the Biggers factors are weighed under step two. See Manson v.

Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977) (" Against these factors is to be weighed
the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself.").
In short, Ramirez did not suggest that a trial court's role in screening
identification evidence "for constitutional defects" includes a general
reliability analysis absent a suggestive official identification procedure. See
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~

II

817 P.2d at 778. Rather, Ramirez depart[ed] fro1n federal case law only to

the degree that ... that federal analytical model [is] scientifically unsupported." Id.
at 780 (emphasis added).
C.

The State's request for clarification of the state due process
analysis is pending before the Utah Supreme Court.

Even so, the supreme court did not ultimately apply step one of the
conditional two-step test in Ramirez. But that court did not need to because

Ramirez- and every eyewitness identification case the supreme court has
since considered-involved at least an
identification procedure.

II

arguably suggestive" official

See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 777-84 (addressing

admissibility of identification following one-person showup arranged by
officers); State v. Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4,

if 17,13-19, 20 P.3d 265 (addressing

admissibility of identification of following two-person showup arranged by
officers); State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ,I,I7,41-47, 993 P.2d 837 (addressing
admissibility of identification following lineup arranged by officers); State v.

Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ,I,f 8,25-30, 48 P.3d 953 (addressing admissibility of
identification following photo array presentation administered by police);

State v. Hollen, 2002 UT 35, ,r,19-11, 29-64, 44 P.3d 794 (same); State v. Willett,
909 P.2d 218,224 (Utah 1995) (sa1ne).
Given the above, in State v. Lujan, the State filed a petition for
certiorari asking the Utah Supreme Court to recognize that absent law
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enforcement misconduct related to an identification procedure, there is no
basis to proceed to the due process question addressing the identification's
reliability.

See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, State v. Lujan, case no.

20150840-SC, at 9-12. In other words, the State is asking the supreme court
to clarify that a conditional two-step analysis applies under both federal and
state due process when assessing the reliability of an allegedly tainted
eyewitness identification.

Under the first step, a defendant seeking to

exclude eyewitness identification evidence must establish that officers used
an "unnecessarily suggestive" identification procedure. Biggers, 409 U.S. at
196. If a defendant meets the first step, the court may proceed to step two.
But if not, the witness's identification should be submitted to the jury
without further inquiry by the trial court. 4

The Utah Supreme Court

granted certiorari review on December 28, 2015. See docket no. 20150840SC.
The State has also asked this Court to follow the two-step analysis
governing eyewitness identifications in State v. Gallegos, case no. 201405714

To the extent language in Hubbard supports that the suggestiveness
of an official identification procedure and the overall reliability of an
identification are independent inquiries, either of which could result in
suppression under state due process, it is mere dicta. 2002 UT 45, ifif25-26.
Indeed, Hubbard purported to do no 1nore than su1nmarize the Ramirez
analysis. See id. But as stated, Ramirez did not take issue with the
conditional two-step approach of the federal model. See 817 P.2d at 779-81.
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r,

~

CA, at 32-35. The Court will hear argument in Gallegos on March 16, 2016.
Therefore three cases-one before the supreme court and two before this
Court-request clarification that the conditional two-part test governs
eyewitness identification challenges.
D. The trial court properly admitted both the on-scene and
subsequent photo-array identifications.
As discussed, pre-h·ial identification of a suspect by photograph will
be suppressed only if the identification procedure was "unnecessarily
suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification as to deny
the accused a fair h·ial." Mccumber, 622 P.2d at 357. This is a case-by-case
question, requiring consideration of the totality of the circumstances
underlying each identification procedure. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S.
377, 384 (1968).

The trial court properly denied Aponte's motion to suppress the
eyewitnesses' identifications, but it did not apply the correct conditional
two-step analysis.

Rather, when addressing the both the on-scene and

subsequent photo-array procedures, the h·ial court first assessed their
reliability under the Long factors before determining whether they were
unnecessarily suggestive. R101-97. That was backwards.
As will be shown, the eyewitnesses' identifications were not the
product

of

suggestion

m

either
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procedure.

Therefore,

treating

suggestiveness as a threshold consideration should end the Court's inquiry
here without triggering the second part of the test. In any event, Miller's
and Smith's independent, clear, and intent focus on the driver in an
exh·emely well-lit area outweighed any suggestiveness and rendered their
subsequent identifications, both at the scene and in the subsequent photo
array, reliable under Ramirez.
1.

Pursuing officers' use of a single photograph to locate a
fleeing felon was not unnecessarily suggestive or likely
to lead to irreparable misidentification.

An "identification based on a single photo is not per se
impennissible." State v. Tltamer, 777 P.2d 432 (Utah 1989) (citing Manson,
432 U.S. at 114). Rather, the reviewing court must conduct the traditional
two-step analysis

to

determine

(1)

whether the single-photograph

identification procedure used was "unnecessarily suggestive," and, if so, (2)
whether the identification nevertheless had sufficient indicia of reliability
independent of the procedure's influence. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 196, 199-200;

see Manson, 432 U.S. at 114 (applying Biggers's reliability factors to
identification by single photograph). As discussed, if the answer to the first
question is "no," the inquiry ends and the identification is admissible.
That threshold inquiry turns, in part, on whether the procedure used
was justified by the urgent character of the circumstances. Simmons, 390
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U.S. at 384. The Supre1ne Court in Simmons recognized that despite "the
hazards of initial identification by photograph, this procedure has been
used widely and effectively in criminal law enforcement, from the
standpoint both of the apprehending officers and of sparing innocent
suspects the ignominy of arrest by allowing eyewitnesses to exonerate the1n
through scrutiny of photographs." Id.

The Court rejected a bank robber's

due process challenge to an emergent photo-identification procedure
similar to that used to identify Aponte. The Court held that federal agents'
use of photographic identification the day after a bank robbery was
"essential" to their quick determination "whether they were on the right
track/' and "so that they could properly deploy their forces in Chicago, and,
if necessary, alert officials in other cities." Id. at 385. The exigency of the
circumstances in Simmons thus precluded a finding that the photo
identification procedure was "unnecessarily suggestive." Biggers, 409 U.S. at
196 (emphasis added).

Like Simmons, Aponte was "still at large" when officers showed
eyewitnesses his photograph. Id. at 384. Indeed, officers' pursuit of Aponte
was hotter than the FBI' s pursuit of Simmons. While agents showed bank
employees Simmons's photograph the day after the robbery, officers here
showed eyewitnesses Aponte' s photograph the same night as the crash and
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while a perimeter was being established around the gas station.

As in

Simmons, it "was essential" for officers to "swiftly ... determine whether they

were on the right track, so that they could properly deploy their forces" and
alert other officials about Aponte' s presence and identifying characteristics.

Id. at 385.
The photo identification procedure was an important means to
achieving those ends. Aponte led officers on a dangerous, high-speed chase
through well-trafficked streets, crashed his vehicle into a ce1nent barrier
mere feet away from gas pumps, and, while fleeing from the crash on foot,
scaled an eight-foot barbed wire fence. It was necessary to identify Aponte
as quickly as possible so that he would not elude the police perimeter and
continue his dangerous spree. Because time was of the essence, compiling
an on-scene photo array would not have been practical.
Miller's and Smith's on-scene identifications appear from the record
to be sufficiently spontaneous and consistent. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783.
Both identified his photograph shortly after they witnessed him crash and
flee on foot. And the record does not support that their identifications were
coerced or the result of blatant suggestion.

Officers did not provide

"opinions, descriptions, identifications," or other information outside of the
photograph itself to investigate what Miller and Smith saw. Id.
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Rather,

Miller approached an officer "on [her] own" to see the photograph he was
showing others. R325:13,18. And while S1nith could not recall precisely the
sequence of events leading to his viewing the photo, he believed that he first
told the officer he "got a really good look at him and could identify him if
needed," before he was shown the photo. R325:33. He elsewhere testified
II

that he told a responding officer that he got a really good look" at the
II

driver and that he was "confident" he could identify hhn easily." R325:28.
Even if the procedure was suggestive, there was ,.,little chance" that
the photo identification procedure here led to misidentification of Aponte.
Simmons, 390 U.S. at 385. Officers pulled Aponte' s photograph only after

his abandoned and injured f e1nale passenger told them his full name.
Miller and Smith merely confirmed Aponte' s identity through that
photograph. They were not the genesis of the search. And both had a clear,
unobstructed view of Aponte while he was in the crashed vehicle and
during part of his flight on foot.

Both witnesses later expressed 99%

certainty that Aponte was the driver.
In short, the initial photo identification was not unnecessarily
suggestive

and

not

substantially

likely

to

lead

to

irreparable

misidentification. Therefore, it could not have tainted Miller's and Smith's
subsequent identifications. In any event, the ten-month period between the
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on-scene identifications and the photo-array identifications removed any
suggestiveness from the single photograph shown to Miller and Smith. Cf

People v. Thompson, 792 N.Y.S.2d 76, 77 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (holding two
months between identification of defendant from wanted poster from a
different case and array identification sufficient to attenuate

any

suggestiveness).
2.

The later photo array was not impermissibly
suggestive, and the overall identification procedure
was reliable under Ramfrez.

Aponte independently challenges the photo array held about ten
months after Miller and S1nith identified the driver in the single
photograph. Br.Aplt.13-14. He complains that the array procedure was
ilnpermissibly suggestive and unreliable. Id. But the photo array bore no
indicia of blatant suggestiveness. The Court therefore does not need to
address the reliability of the identifications. In any event, both the on-scene
and subsequent photo-array identifications well exceeded the standard set
forth in Ranzirez. See State v. Hollen, 2002 UT 35, if29, 44 P.3d 794 (assessing
"the overall reliability" of identifications from a photo array and subsequent
lineup).

The photo array was not unnecessarily suggestive. As explained, the first
step in detennining the admissibility of an eyewih1ess identification is
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whether it "was the product of suggestion." Ramirez, P.2d at 781 (quoting

Long, 721 P.2d at 493). In evaluating a photo array for suggestiveness, the
11

main question is whether the photo array emphasized the defendant's
photo over the others," i.e., whether officers administering the array-via
"words" or "body language" -conveyed '' an attitude of disinterest,"
whether they manipulated the array "to indicate their belief that one of the
photos portrayed the perpeh·ator," or whether officers otherwise caused the
defendant's photo "to stand out."

State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1111-12

(Utah 1994); see also State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, ~32 n.22, 223 P.3d 1103

("Clopten I"); accord Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783 (citi.rtg Long, 721 P.2d at 494 n.8).
Other relevant factors include "the length of time between observation and
identification" and "the value of photo identifications compared to inperson identifications." Clopten I, 2009 UT 84, if 32 n.22; accord Ramirez, 817
P.2d at 783 (citing Long, 721 P.2d at 494 n.8).
'

:.,

Factors relevant in evaluating whether a witness's behavior might

\lllil

indicate that an identification was the product of suggestion include (1) the
11

wib1ess' s spontaneity and consistency in 1naking the identification, (2) the
witness's mental capacity and state of mind at the time of the
identification," (3) "instances when the witness or other eyewitnesses to the
event failed to identify defendant," and (4) "instances when the witness or
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other eyewitnesses gave a description of the actor that is inconsistent with
defendant." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781, 783. Witness confidence is another
relevant factor that may be examined. See State v. Guzman, 2006 UT 12, if 23,
133 P.3d 363 (holding that courts may also "weigh certainty testimony" in
assessing reliability, even though not required to be considered under

Rarnirez).
['.

'iiiiil

Here, officers presented a photo array that included a different
photograph of Aponte than was shown to Miller and Smith the night of the
crash.

Miller and Smith again identified Aponte as the driver.

Miller

"immediately" identified Aponte, and both were 99% certain their
identification was correct.

R91-89; R325:20,29-30.

Nothing suggests the

eyewitnesses lacked perceptual and mental acuity at the time of the array,
or that their state of mind was anything but calm. Both gave corroborating
accounts of Aponte' s facial features and what he was wearing the night of
the crash. The witnesses' identifications thus remained consistent from the
night of the crash through the photo array held ten months later, and they
both confirmed at trial that they were still 99% positive the man
photographed was the driver. R328:177,192. And while a third eyewitness
picked another man in the photo array with 70% certainty, he also selected
Aponte with 30% certainty. R91,88. That witness had only a very brief
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glimpse of the driver's profile the night of the crash.

Id.

Finally, as

discussed, the ten-1nonth period between Miller's and Smith's on-scene
identifications and the photo array attenuated any suggestiveness from the
single photograph.
And while the trial court noted that not all the other individuals in
the photographs "had characteristics identical to" Aponte, the array itself
was not "impermissibly suggestive." R98. As the h·ial court noted, the six
assembled men had light complexions and only three were lighter than
Aponte, who is Hispanic. Id.; see also Lopez, 886 P.2d at 1112 (holding photo
array composed of subjects matched by skin tone rather than ethnicity "was
sufficient," where" descriptions of the subjects in the photo array match the
description of the suspect"). Some of the men had shaved heads, some had
a "small amount of facial hair," they were all "roughly the same age," and
they were all shown "with the same jail booking photo background."
R325:39; R90-88. Three of the men had goatees, including Aponte. Id. Any
slight variations between Aponte' s photo and others' did not render the
photo array impermissibly suggestive.
While officers told Miller and Smith that the person they identified
the night of the crash was present in the array, Aponte does not explain
why he believes this was impermissibly suggestive. Br.Aplt.13-14. Nothing
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in the record de1nonsh·ates that officers manipulated the array or betrayed a
belief that any one photograph portrayed the driver. Thamer, 777 P.2d at
435. Instead, officers ensured the array was not suggestive by compiling
photos of individuals with materially shnilar features and using a different
photo of Aponte than Miller or Smith had seen before. In any event, the
witnesses' prior identifications of "the unique characteristics of the
~I

accused ... offset an implication of suggestiveness." Id. As the trial court
determined, the witnesses' initial on-scene identifications were "strong" and
corroborated by the passenger in the stolen vehicle. Rl00,98-97.
Aponte nevertheless argues that Smith, by looking up an online
"image" of Aponte at some point between the night of the crash and the
photo array, "further solidif[ied] his identification of Aponte' s photograph at
the crime scene." Br.Aplt.14 (emphasis in original). But Aponte misreads
the record. Before trial, defense counsel alerted the court that Smith had
allegedly viewed an internet photograph of Aponte either before or after the
photo array. R328:88-89. But Smith testified at trial that he did not even
know Aponte' s name until after the photo array, which took place the day of
the suppression hearing.

R328:197.

And Smith conceded only that he

"'looked up Aponte's name" -not his image-after the array occurred. Id.
(emphasis added). The internet search thus could not have affected the
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photo array identification. Only the reverse is possible. And even if S1nith
had looked up Aponte's photo in the interim, it would not have in any way
implicated official misconduct or police action.
At bottom, the photo array bore no resemblance to the blatantly
suggestive one-man showup in Ramirez, where the sole eyewitness saw the
suspect surrounded by officers, handcuffed to a chain-link fence, and
illuminated by police spotlights. 817 P.2d at 777, 783-84. The photo array
was not unnecessarily suggestive, or even arguably so.

The Court may

affirm the admission of Miller's and Smith's identifications without further
inquiry.

The overall identification procedure was reliable. In any event, even if the
identification procedures were suggestive, they well exceeded the reliability
standard set forth in Ramirez. An evaluation of the Long factors against any
arguable suggestiveness of the procedures shows that the identifications
were "sufficiently reliable so as not to offend due process." Hubbard, 2002

UT 45, ,J30. In making this determination, the Court should consider:
(1)

(2)
(3)

the opportunity of the witness to view the actor during
the event;
the witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of
the event;
the witness's capacity to observe the event, including his
or her physical and mental acuity;
... and
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(5)

the nature of the event being observed and the likelihood
that the witness would perceive, remember and relate it
correctly.

Id. (quoting State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483,493 (Utah 1986)).
J'/Where "the factors bearing on reliability clearly indicate that the
identifications ... were at least as reliable as the identification in Ramirez,"
admission of the eyewitness identifications does not violate state due
€;1

process. State v. Hollen, 2002 UT 35, if 64, 44 P.3d 794.
In Ramirez, two masked robbers, one armed with a pipe and the other
~I

with a gun, attacked a restaurant manager and her two male companions at
night, in a dimly-lit parking lot behind the restaurant. 817 P.2d at 776.
While the manager and one of her companions went back into the
restaurant to retrieve the bank deposit bag, a scuffle ensued outside
between the eyewitness and the robbers. Id. The robber with the pipe hit
the eyewitness and instructed the masked gunman to kill the eyewitness if
he moved. Id. The eyewitness never saw the gunman's full face. Id. at 784.
He later identified Ramirez as the gunman at a "showup" held shortly after
the crime where Ramirez- the only person present who was not a police
officer-was handcuffed to a fence and illuminated with police spotlights.

Id. at 777, 783-84.
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The Utah Supreme Court held that this identification was admissible
even though Ramirez had worn a scarf that covered 1nost of his face and the
witness viewed him for only '"a few seconds' or 'a second' to 'a minute' or
longer" at nighttime in the shadowy area of a parking lot, with lighting
described variously as "good" and as "poor."

Id. at 776, 782-83.

Even

though neither of the remaining victims could identify Ramirez, the
suggestiveness

of

the

showup

identification

did

not render

the

identification so unreliable that due process required its exclusion. Id. at

783, 784.
Smith's and Miller's identifications well exceeded Ramirez's reliability
standard.

First, Miller and S1nith both had ample opportunity to view

Aponte. The gas station's pump area was very well-lit that night, and both
witnesses had a clear, unobstructed view of the driver after he crashed into
the cement pillar by the pumps. R325:10,17,28. Miller testified that the area
was "probably as bright" as the courtromn.

R325:10.

She stood about

twenty feet away from the vehicle when it crashed, and watched the driver
for about three minutes, starting "from the time of hnpact until the time he
ran in front of" her. R325:18. She saw him "straight on" while he talked to
the female passenger. R325:17. He eventually ran "right in front" of herwithin "five to six feet." R325:7. Miller reme1nbered hhn wearing jeans, a
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white tee shirt, and "a navy blue bandana on his head, tied in the back," and
that he was of "medium cmnplexion" and "appeared to have a goatee."
R325:9. Miller saw his eyes from that close distance, and testified that he
gave her a "back off" look. R325:8.
S1nith was only ten feet away from the driver after the vehicle struck
his. R325:32. Smith had a clear, unobstructed view of his face for about five
to ten seconds. R325:28,33. Smith testified that the driver looked "right at"
him as he ran by Smith's window. R325:25,32-33. Smith made eye contact
with the driver both when he was trying to get out of the crashed vehicle
and when he ran past Smith's window.

Id.

The driver had a "short

trhnn1ed goatee, a shaved head," and wore jeans, a white tee shirt, and a
blue bandana. Id.

~/

Unlike in Ramirez, Aponte' s face was not obscured or

covered so as to prevent Miller or Smith from seeing him. Ramirez, 817 P.2d
at 776. Both witnesses had a much better opportunity to view Aponte than
the sole witness in Ramirez.
Second, Miller and Smith paid Aponte significant attention. During
the three minutes Miller watched the driver, she looked "intently" at hhn to
"see if [she] knew him." R325:16. Miller watched the driver the "whole
time." R325:6. She expressly recalled thinking to herself, "[T]his is a big
deal, you better pay attention." R325:9. S1nith similarly "fixed" his gaze on
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the driver and made eye contact with him multiple times during the five-toten second window when he had an unobstructed view of the man's face.
R325:28,33. Any slight diversion caused by the chaos of the crash scene was

insignificant compared to that in Ramirez, where the suspect' s cohort
wielded a pipe and 1nade threats against the eyewitness. The chaos of the
scene, contrary to Aponte's view, intensified the witnesses' focus on Aponte
because he was the source of it.

(~,
\l11V

Third, Miller and Smith had adequate capacity to observe Aponte.
Aponte has never argued otherwise. Neither witness testified that anything
affected their ability to see Aponte that night. And nothing in the record
suggests that their mental capacity or state of mind, aside from normal
excitement or agitation, negatively affected their identification.

To the

conh·ary, the excitement of the event led at least Miller to think to herself,
"[T]his is a big deal, you better pay attention." R325:9.
Finally, the event was such that Miller and Smith would likely
perceive, remember, and relate it correctly.

Aponte has never argued

otherwise. Miller testified that her 1nemory of the event was "[e]xh·emely
strong," a "ten." R328:18. Again, she expressly recalled thinking to herself,
"[T]his is a big deal, you better pay attention." R325:9. Smith was even
nearer the vehicle because it collided with his.
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He would later tell a

II

responding officer that he got a really good look" at the driver and that he
II

was "confident" he could identify him easily." R325:28.
The conditions of identification here rendered the eyewitnesses'
II

testhnony far superior to that deemed constitutionally reliable in Ramirez."

Hollen, 2002 UT 35, ~ 64. The identifications all derived from a less stressful
and violent event than occurred in Ramirez, were made by individuals
unimpaired by visual, medical, or physical barriers, and occurred under less
suggestive circumstances.
The overall reliability assess1nent must be made by considering '" the
facts in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision to admit the
challenged testhnony and giving due deference to the trial judge's ability to
appraise demeanor evidence."'

Id. (quoting Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784)

(alterations omitted from Hollen). Weighed against the non-suggestive onscene identification and subsequent photo array, the favorable conditions
rendered Miller's and S1nith' s identifications reliable, and the trial court
properly admitted them. Any reliability concerns were properly put to the
Jury.

"I
~I
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E.

Alternatively, admission of the identifications was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because Aponte's
passenger consistently identified him as the driver.

Aponte argues that the alleged errors in the identification procedures
were harmful. Br.Aplt.17. But even if Miller and Smith had not identified
Aponte at trial, the jury would still have convicted him on the testimony of
his passenger, who was consistent in her account that he was the driver.

Ramirez held that the standard harmless error analysis applies when a
defendant challenges an eyewitness's identification.

817 P.2d at 787.

Aponte therefore bears the burden to demonsh·ate "a reasonable likelihood
of a more favorable result had the identification not been admitted." Id. at
788; see also Clopten, 2009 UT 84, ,I39; State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d 940, 944 (Utah
App. 1997) (applying standard harmless error analysis in analyzing the
admissibility of eyewitness identification testimony). And while this Court
in Lujan recently applied a harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard to

an eyewitness identification challenge, the Utah Supreme Court has granted
certiorari review of that determination.

See Lujan, case no. 20150840-SC.

Regardless of which standard applies, any error here was hannless beyond
a reasonable doubt.
Aponte left his passenger injured at the gas station and fled on foot,
and when responding officers questioned her about the identity of the
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driver, she told them he was Santiago Aponte.

R328:146.

'She again

identified Aponte as the driver at trial, and the jury heard that she had
received nothing in exchange for testimony. R328:125. Indeed, she was
subpoenaed to testify.

R328:128.

And while she had prior convictions,

including one for possession stemming from the night of the crash and
another for giving false information to a police officer, nothing in the record
<;1

suggested that she had an incentive to fabricate this time.

R328:123-26.

Santiago's other convictions for fleeing officers, including one where a
passenger again identified him as the driver, dispelled any suspicion that
Robertson was now somehow framing Aponte.
Aponte's argument that she "was untruthful with police in this case"
is thus conclusory. Br.Aplt.17. He may be referring to her interview with
officers at the hospital, where she was a "little uncooperative." R328:11819,123,145. One of the officers wrote in his report that she "was not willing
to tell the h·uth" during that interview. R328:118. But the record provides
nothing more about what she said. Her consistency in identifying Aponte
as the driver at Hart's and later at trial overcomes any ambiguity in the
record of this hospital interview beyond a reasonable doubt.
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II.

This Court should not reach Aponte's unpreserved argument
that the trial court relied on invalid non-character purposes
when admitting his other convictions for fleeing.

Aponte argues that the trial court abused its discretion, under rule
404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, in admitting his two convictions for evading
officers - once a year before the Hart's crash and again only weeks after the
crash. Br.Aplt.17-20. But he does not argue that evidence was irrelevant
under rule 402, or unduly prejudicial under rule 403.

Rather, his sole

argument on appeal is that the h·ial court erred in identifying proper noncharacter purposes for the evidence.

Id.

Aponte aims his challenge

primarily at the jury instruction naming the non-character purposes for
which the other convictions could be considered. Id. at 18-19. He complains
that the jury was not properly instructed on the meaning of the noncharacter purposes given - namely, (1) lack of mistake or accident, (2)
knowledge, (3) opportunity, and (4) the doctrine of chances. Id. at 19-20.
And he argues that none of those purposes justified admission of his other
attempted evasion convictions. Id. This Court should not reach these issues
because they are unpreserved and Aponte argues no appellate justification
for review.
Aponte has not shown- and cannot show- that but for the admission
of the other convictions for attempted evasion, he would have likely
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received a different verdict here. The primary issue at h·ial was the identity
of the driver who led police on a high-speed chase and eventually crashed
his vehicle at a gas station. The passenger of that vehicle identified Aponte
as the driver both to police and to the jury. Two eyewitnesses to the crash
also consistently identified Aponte as the driver. Aponte cannot show a
reasonable likelihood of a better outcome on this evidence. In any event,
the court committed no error by admitting Aponte's other vehicular flights
from police to (1) show that he could not have been mistaken about police
pursuing hhn in this case, and (2) rebut Aponte's defense that his passenger

Q

was fabricating Aponte' s involvement.
A.

G;1

Proceedings below.

Before trial, the State moved to admit Aponte's two convictions for
leading police on high-speed chases. R121-114. About a year before the
Hart's crash, Aponte fled frmn an officer who tried to pull him over for
driving 80 miles per hour in a 40-mile-per-hour zone. R121. The officer
stopped pursuing Aponte for the public's safety. R120. Aponte ran two red
lights and a stop sign and eventually crashed. Id. Officers found him lying
near the vehicle. Id. He had apparently tried to flee on foot. Id. Aponte
pleaded guilty to one count of attempted failure to respond to an officer's
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signal to stop, a class A misdemeanor, one count of DUI, a class B
misdemeanor, and speeding, a class C 111isde1neanor. Id.
Weeks after the Hart's crash, officers approached Aponte in his
vehicle after hearing that he or one of his passengers threatened to commit
an assault. Id. Aponte responded by rolling up the window, putting the
vehicle in reverse, and speeding away. Id. While officers pursued him, he
committed several traffic violations. Id. Officers eventually decided to stop
the chase for public safety.

Id.

They later interviewed the vehicle's

passenger and learned that Aponte was the driver. Id. A subsequent photo
array confirmed this.

Id.

The passenger told officers that Aponte fled

because he had outstanding warrants and was afraid of being deported. Id.
Aponte pleaded guilty to attempted failure to respond to an officer's signal
to stop, a class A misdemeanor, and reckless driving, a class B
misdemeanor. Id.
The State initially sought admission of these two convictions to prove
Aponte' s "identity ... as the driver of the vehicle that evaded police," and his
"motive to evade and flee frmn police because of his fear of possible
deportation." R118. At oral argument on the motion, the State abandoned
its motive theory, but argued that Aponte's evasion convictions served
other non-character purposes: they showed the absence of accident or
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mistake in his flight from police, his intent in fleeing, and, that, under the
doctrine of chances, the probability of eyewih1ess 1nisidentification in this
case was remote. Rl 18,R327:6-12.
Aponte conceded in his response to the State's 404(b) motion that
u

identity is a proper use" of the other acts evidence. Rl 90. He at no point

objected to the State's other proposed non-character purposes, either in his
written response or during oral argument. R191-187; R327:13-14. Instead,
he argued that the evidence was "extremely prejudicial" and likely to cause
jurors to convict him "based upon the past convictions only." R190;R327:1314.
The h·ial court granted the State's motion. R327:14-17 (Addendum B).
The court first determined that the other attempted evasion convictions
were admissible to show Aponte' s intent to flee in this case. R327:14. The
court also ruled that the evidence showed absence of mistake or accidenti.e., that "he wasn't just leaving because he didn't know better." Id. The
court further ruled that the other convictions were ad1nissible to show
Aponte' s "knowledge about what he was doing." Id. And while the court
initially had "a hard time making the bridge from prior similar incidents to
identity," it ulthnately determined that the evidence was admissible to
show identity "because it shows that what the witnesses observed was
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something that this person would not do by accident." R327:14,16. The h ial
4

•

i:'.:\

court also ruled that the evidence was admissible under the doctrine of
chances. R327:16. Because Aponte previously wrecked a vehicle and ran
away from it, the chances of it being a mistake or accident this time were
"quite remote." Id.
The court also ruled that the evidence of Aponte' s other convictions
was not unduly prejudicial under the Shicldes factors.

It was strong

evidence because Aponte pleaded guilty to the offenses, and both were
similar to the current crime in that he was "running away from the
vehicles." R327:14. The court found, however, that Aponte' s earlier crash
was dissimilar to the current one in that Aponte crashed "in different
places" and with varying degrees of force. R327:15. But the intervals of
time separating all three crimes were not long. Id. And the State's alternate
evidence was "not open and shut." Id. Finally, the State's proposed method
of presenting only certified copies of the attempted evasion convictions,
with other convictions redacted, minimized the danger of unfair prejudice.
R327:3-4,16-17.
In a stipulated statement, the jury heard that in 2012 an officer tried to
stop Aponte for driving eighty miles per hour in a forty-mile-per-hour zone.
R328:209. Instead of stopping, Aponte ran two red lights and stop sign. Id.
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Officers chased Aponte only briefly before abandoning their pursuit for
public safety reasons. Id.

Aponte crashed his vehicle, and officers later

found him lying in the grass beside it. Id.
The jury also heard that weeks after the Hart's crash, officers
responded to a report of some men in a vehicle "who were threatening
another individual." R328:209. Aponte was the driver. Id. When officers
approached him, he "rolled up the window." Id. He then "put the car in
reverse and fled." R328:209-10. With officers in pursuit, Aponte drove "in
~I

excess of 75 an hour," passing vehicles "on the left by crossing over the
continuous turning lane." R328:210. Officers stopped the pursuit for the
public's safety. Id. Officers discovered that Aponte was the driver after
contacting the vehicle's owner, who said that he had given the vehicle to
Aponte. Id. The jury also heard that "officers later identified [Aponte] as
the driver during an interview with the front seat passenger and use of a
photo lineup." Id.
Immediately after the stipulated statement was read, the trial court
gave jurors a verbal limiting instruction that the state1nent "was not being
offered to show that because Mr. Aponte had fled frmn police twice before
he fled again this thne." R328:10. The court continued that the stipulation
was "not showing that it's the nature of his character or he has a propensity
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to flee from police." Id. "Rather," the court instructed, "it will be used by
you for other things that the prosecutor is trying to prove." Id. The court
told jurors that it would give them further insh·uction at the close of the
evidence. R328:210-11.
During cross-examination of the officer who h·ied to pull over the
Chevy Impala, Aponte's counsel asked whether the driver was aware he
was being followed. R328:152-53. Counsel asked, "In your training and
experience have you [run] into issues where people will not notice your
lights or your audibles?"

R328:152.

The officer testified that he "very

rarely" had "anyone at night not stop." Id. But counsel elicited that the
officer " [o]ccasionally" encountered vehicles that would not stop when
"there were other lights." Id. Counsel also elicited that the officer could not
say with certainty that the driver heard or saw his vehicle. R328:153.
Aponte proposed a written limiting instruction that directed jurors to
consider the 404(b) evidence, "if at all, for the limited purpose of identity
and 1notive." Rl 97. While discussing the jury instructions, the prosecutor
told the court that he intended to use Aponte's prior flights from police to
argue absence of accident or mistake. R328:217. The prosecutor proposed
listing "doctrine of chances" in the instruction as an appropriate noncharacter use of the evidence. R328:219. The trial court agreed to include it.
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Id. Aponte did not object at any point during the parties' discussion about
the 404(b) instruction. See generally R328:216-21. The court told the parties
that it would give them a finalized copy of the instructions for their
approval before closing arguments.

R328:221-22.

The record does not

contain the parties' final approval of the instructions.
The trial court ultiinately gave a limiting instruction directing jurors
to "consider this evidence, if at all, for the limited purposes of absence of
mistake or accident, knowledge, opportunity, and the doctrine of chances."
R264. That instruction provided that the evidence "was not admitted to
prove the character trait of the defendant or to show that he acted in a
manner consistent with such a trait." Id. The court further warned, °Keep
in mind that the defendant is on trial for the crilne(s) charged in this case,
and for those crimes only. You may not convict a person simply because
you believe he may have committed some other acts at another time." Id.
Aponte did not object to including absence of mistake or accident,
knowledge, opportunity, or the docb~ine of chances as limited purposes in
the insh·uction. Neither did he object that those purposes were not properly
(;;1

defined in the instructions. See generally R328:215-222.
The record does not contain the trial judge's final verbal instructions
to the jury. It does note that he read £annal written instructions before
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closing argument.

R329:225.

And the prosecutor, during his closing

rebuttal, noted that the judge "described the doch·ine of chances." R329:248.
The prosecutor also explained the doctrine, describing it as a "probability
theory." R329:248-49. "It's a theory of logical relevance that rests on the
objective improbability of the same rare misfortune befalling one individual
over and over again." Id.
The prosecutor argued that the circumstances of Aponte's other
convictions

for

evading

officers

rendered

misidentification here an effectual nullity.

the

R329:249-50.

probability

of

The prosecutor

pointed out that following Aponte' s flight from police mere weeks after the
Hart's crash, officers again identified and later apprehended him by
interviewing his front-seat passenger and using a photo array. Id.

The

prosecutor also argued that the other convictions showed Aponte had the
knowledge and opportunity to commit the current offense: "We have the
two other convictions for attempted evading, for not responding to law
enforcement's command to stop, the red and blues and sirens and so forth."
R329:249.

Aponte's closing argument focused almost exclusively on what he
claimed were gaps in the State's eyewitness identifications. R329:241-46.
But defense counsel, in his final state1nents, also asked the jury to consider
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whether there were "issues dealing with any of these alleged offenses."
R329:146.
B.

Aponte has not asserted plain error; review is thus precluded.
This Court should not reach Aponte' s challenge to the validity of the

non-character purposes advanced by the State and incorporated into the
jury's 404(b) instruction because he did not preserve it below and does not
argue plain error on appeal.
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be
raised on appeal."

State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,r11, 10 P.3d 346.

To

preserve an issue for appeal, "the issue must be presented to the h·ial court
in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue."

438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ~51, 99 P.3d 801 (citation and
quotations omitted). Further, "the objection 1nust be specific enough to give
the trial court notice of the very error ... cmnplained of." State v. Larsen, 2011
UT App 426, ,J2, 267 P.3d 969 (per curiam) (ciation and quotations omitted)
(ellipses in original). Thus, "if a party makes an objection at trial based on
one ground, his objection does not preserve for appeal any alternative
grounds for objection." State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, '1j17, 192 P.3d 867. And if a
defendant "does not argue that exceptional circumstances or plain error
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justifies review" of an unpreserved issue, review is precluded.

State v.

Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995).
In challenging the admission of his other evasion convictions, Aponte
argues only that the trial court grounded their admission on improper noncharacter purposes and did not adequately define those purposes in the jury
instructions.

Br.Aplt.19-20.

He argues that the non-character purposes

presented in the jury's limiting instruction were not "legitimate bases"
because, he claims, "the only contested issue was the identity of the
suspect."

Id. at 19.

He continues that the jury "received no further

insh·uction on this evidence, no definitions for these limited purposes, and
no 1neaningful guidance on how to apply them to the facts." Id. at 18.
While Aponte now objects to the non-character purposes proffered by
the State and ultimately incorporated into the jury's limiting instruction, he
never objected that they were improper below. Indeed, he conceded that
the State's proposed purpose of showing identity was proper. R190. He
also proposed his own limiting instruction that included identity and
motive as purposes for the jury to consider. R197. And while the trial court
did not ultimately include identity or motive in the limiting instruction's list
of other purposes, he never objected to any on the list.

See generally

R328:215-222. Indeed, he presumably passed the instruction entirely. The

-57-

record does not include the parties' final approval of the jury instructions,
but that record gap must be counted against Aponte. See State v. Litherland,
2000 UT 76, ,Ill, 12 P.3d 92 ("If an appellant fails to provide an adequate
record on appeal, this Court must assume the regularity of the proceedings
below.") (citations and quotations omitted).
Aponte had the opportunity to argue that the State's proposed noncharacter purposes were improper during oral argument on the State's
404(b) motion, where the State advanced theories of intent, absence of
accident or mistake, and the doctrine of chances. His only objection there
was that the 404(b) evidence's danger for unfair prejudice substantially
outweighed its probative value-an argument he has abandoned on appeal.
R190-188; R327:13-14.

He had further opportunity to object during the

parties' extended discussion before closing arguments about what should
go into the limiting instruction. R328:215-222. But during that discussion,
he at no point objected to the State's proposed non-character purposes or
the ones that ulthnately went to the jury. See generally id.
Because Aponte has not articulated '"an appropriate justification for
appellate review"' of his unpreserved 404(b) claim, this Court should not
address it. State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, if14, 128 P.3d 1171 (quoting State v.
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Pinder, 2005 UT 15, ~45, 114 P.3d 551); see also State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, if36
n.6, 122 P.3d 543; Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229 n.5.
C.

Aponte has not shown- and cannot show - prejudice.

Even if this Court determines that Aponte preserved his claim, he has
not shown-and cannot show-prejudice, which defeats any claim of error.

See State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ~51, 299 P.3d 892; Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,Ill.
To demonstrate prejudice, Aponte would have to show that "there is a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome" absent the alleged
error. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).
Aponte cannot show prejudice on this record because the jury would
have convicted him even without the State's 404(b) evidence. An officer
testified that when he tried to pull over a Chevy Impala, the driver led hhn
on a reckless, high-speed chase through city traffic.

The officer had to

eventually abandon the pursuit for public safety. Shortly afterwards, he
found the same vehicle crashed at a Hart's gas station.

The injured

passenger told police that the driver, who had fled on foot, was Aponte.
Two eyewitnesses saw the crash and got a clear, close view of the driver
under exh emely bright lighting before he fled.
•

When shown Aponte's

photograph, they both recognized him as the driver. They identified him
again ten 1nonths later in a different photo that_ was part of an array of other
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individuals with similar facial fea tu.res.

The passenger and the two

eyewitnesses again identified Aponte as the driver at trial. Both at the array
and h·ial, the witnesses were 99% sure that Aponte was the driver. Aponte
cannot show a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome on this
evidence.
D. In any event, Aponte has not shown error.
Aponte's other fleeing convictions answered a question that he
himself raised at trial: whether he was mistaken about police pursuing him
this time. And the h·ial court properly allowed the State to introduce his
other convictions to rebut his theories that the passenger fabricated
Aponte' s involvement and eyewitnesses misidentified him.
While the rules of evidence generally prohibit admission of criminal
history to show that a defendant acted in conformity with a particular
character h·ait, the evidence is admissible if offered to prove "motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of
mistake, or lack of accident."

Utah R. Evid. 404(b)(2).

Rule 404(b)'s

language is "inclusionary, rather than exclusionary," 1neaning that other
acts evidence may be admitted despite its potential to yield a "negative
propensity inference." State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, 8ifl4, 328 P.3d 841. A
party seeking inh·oduction of the evidence may proffer multiple purposes
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for its use, but "only one valid, noncharacter purpose is required."

Id.

(citing State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, ,I22, 6 P.3d 673).
Aponte is wrong to argue that knowledge and absence of accident or
mistake were not at issue. Br.Aplt.19. He placed them in issue when crossexamining the officer who tried to pull him over by asking whether the
ii@

driver was aware he was being followed. R328:152-53. Aponte's counsel
elicited that the officer "[o]ccasionally" encountered vehicles that would not
stop when "there were other lights." Id. And the jury heard the officer
admit that he could not say with certainty that the driver heard or saw his
police vehicle.

R328:153.

Aponte' s other convictions for fleeing were

properly admitted to show that he could not have been mistaken about the
police pursuit.

The convictions showed that he was not now driving

recklessly for its own sake, unaware of the police vehicle following him.
Because the evidence rebutted a defense of mistake that Aponte put before
the jury, it was properly admitted for that purpose. Aponte thus cannot
show that it was error for the trial court to allow it on that basis. See Lucero,
2014 UT 15, ,I14 (" only one valid, noncharacter purpose is required").
Aponte also has not shown that the trial court's admission of the
evidence under the doch·ine of chances was improper. The State advanced
this theory to show the improbability of Aponte's passenger fabricating his
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involvement and Hart's eyewitnesses misidentifying him, where

a

passenger from another high-speed chase identified him as the driver and
officers confirmed that identification in a subsequent photo array.
R329:249-50.
~:

Under the doctrine of chances, the more often something similar
happens, the less likely it is due to accident, chance, justification, third party
action, or the like. See State v. Verde, 2012 UT 60, ifif47-52, 296 P.3d 673
(discussing doctrine of chances in context of 404(b) evidence); see also United

States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343, 1350 (7th Cir. 1991) (explaining that if you win
the lottery once, you get congratulated; if you win twice, you get
investigated); overruled on other grounds by Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562
(7th Cir. 1999). The doctrine provides a framework for admission of other
bad acts "to rebut a charge of fabrication." Verde, 2012 UT 60, if 47.
The trial court properly admitted Aponte's prior convictions under
the doch·ine to rebut Aponte' s fabrication claim. A year before Aponte' s
reckless flight from police and crash at Hart's, he led officers on a highspeed chase that they had to similarly abandon for public safety. Aponte
crashed his vehicle then as well, and apparently tried to flee on foot before
officers found him lying in nearby grass. R120. Only weeks after the Hart's
incident, he engaged police in yet another high-speed chase that had to be
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abandoned for public safety. There, officers were similarly able to identify
him as the driver after speaking with his passenger and conducting a photo
array.

This evidence showed that it was highly unlikely that Aponte's

passenger fabricated her testimony tying him to the flight and crash or that
eyewitnesses misidentified him at Hart's and in a subsequent photo array.
To the extent Aponte argues that the doctrine of chances or other noncharacter purposes were improperly defined in the instructions, review is
precluded because he failed to preserve this challenge and does not provide
the Court justification for appellate review. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ,I14. In any
event, the record refutes Aponte's assertion that the doctrine was not
explained to jurors.

Br.Aplt.18,19.

The prosecutor, during closing,

reminded jurors of the judge's earlier discussion of the doctrine before
giving his own. R329:248. The judge's verbal instructions, given before
closing arguments, are omitted from the record. R329:225. That record gap,
which presumably covers all of the non-character purposes listed in the
404(b) insh·uction, must be construed against Aponte. Litherland, 2000 UT
76, ~11. In any event, the prosecutor explained the doctrine of chances as "a
theory of logical relevance that rests on the objective improbability of the
same rare misfortune befalling one individual over and over again."
R329:248. That was adequate.
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Aponte suggests, in a single phrase of a caption introducing his 404(b)
argument, that the trial court failed to "scrupulously exa1nine" the State's
evidence for a proper non-character purpose.

Br.Aplt.17.

Beyond this

passing reference to the scrupulous examination standard, he provides no
briefing or other mention of it. This is inadequate.
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires a
defendant's brief to "contain ... citations to the authorities, statutes, and
parts of the record relied on."

Briefing is inadequate when "it merely

contains bald citations to authority" without "development of that
authority." Id. (quotations and citation omitted). If a party "fails to offer
any 1neaningful analysis, [the court will] decline to reach the merits." State
v. Garner, 2002 UT App 234, if 12, 52 P.3d 467. This Court should decline any

invitation to address the trial court's scrutiny of the other acts evidence,
because Aponte has not briefed, much less adequately briefed, a scrupulous
examination argument. The Court should further decline consideration of
the issue because Aponte never objected that the trial court's examination of
the evidence was unscrupulous, and he does not argue any justification for
appellate review in light of that preservation failure. Winfield, 2006 UT 4,
i,14; Cruz, 2005 UT 45, if 36 n.6; Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229 n.5.
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Q

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
@

Respectfully submitted on February 29, 2016.
SEAN D. REYES

Utah Attorney General

~

Assistant Attorney General
. .Counsel for Appellee ·

®

@
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RULING AND ORDER ON MOTION TO

STATE OF UTAH,

SUPPRESS EYEWITNESS
Plaintiff,

IDENTIFICATION

vs.
Case No. 141400333
SANTIAGO A VILA APONTE,
Defendant.

Judge Samuel D. McVey

Defendant moved to suppress evidence of eyewitness identifications from a single photo
and a photo lineup array. The parties submitted the matter on the evidence of the preliminary
hearing, supplemented by the actual photo array. The Court heard arguments of counsel and
reviewed their memoranda. Counsel submitted the matter for decision.
FACTS
On August 31, 2013, Sergeant Huff was attempting to stop a vehicle reported as stolen.
The vehicle accelerated and fled. A witness told Huff the vehicle had crashed at a local gas
station. Huff arrived at the station and saw the vehicle. The driver had fled the scene.

A passenger in the car remained and told Huff the driver was Defendant, Aponte. Huff
obtained a photo of a man named Aponte from public files and showed it to two witnesses at the
scene. Each witness identified defendant as the driver of the car from this photograph. Each
witness also reported getting a good, sustained look at the driver of the vehicle while he was
rwming away. They saw the photos shortly after witnessing the accident. Based on this positive
identification, and witness information on where defendant was headed, police later apprehended
him.
About 10 months later on June 9, 2014, Huff created a photo array of six individuals,
including defendant, and showed it to three witnesses, including the two who had identified his
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photo at the scene. Those two witnesses identified defendant as the driver with "99%" certainty.
Another witness narrowed the list down to defendant (30% certainty) and another person's photo
(70% certainty).
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues each photo identification at the scene should be suppressed as
suggestive and, since showing the photos at the scene tainted the subsequent identification, and
all of the photo demonstrations would taint any further identification at trial, any eyewitness
identification should be suppressed. The Court addresses these points as a gatekeeper for
determining whether the identifications are sufficiently reliable and non-tainted to be presented to
the jury. State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ~ 30, 48 P.3d 953, 963. See also State v. Guzman, 2004
UT App 211, ~ 18, 95 P.3d 302, 307.

A. IDENTIFICATION AT TRIAL
In State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, 130, 48 PJd 953, 963, our Supreme Court stated:
Since State v. Long, 721 P.2d, 483 (Utah 1986) we have used five factors as a test
for analyzing, as a preliminary constitutional matter, whether an eyewitness
identification is sufficiently reliable to be presented to the jury. See, e.g., Hollen,
2002 UT 35, ~~ 26-63; State v. Hofjhine, 2001 UT 4, ~ 18, 20 PJd 265 (quoting
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493)),· State v. Decorso,
1999 UT 57, 142, 993 P.2d 837 (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493).The factors are
as follows:
( 1) the opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; (2)
the witness' degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; (3) the
witness' capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical and
mental acuity; (4) whether the witness' identification was made
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the
product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being observed and
the likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and relate it
correctly.

Long, 781 P .2d at 493. "While these factors provide guidance, the list is certainly not an
~

exhaustive or exclusive list of factors that may be considered in determining whether an
identification is reliable, and, therefore, not violative of due process." Hubbard, at 127-29.
also Guzman, at 1 18, 95 P.3d 302, 307.

2

See

In this case, the witness identifications at the crime scene satisfy these elements. There
seems to be no real dispute on this point. The witnesses each had a good look at the suspect,
being within 25 feet in an extremely well-lit area. One witness was within a half car length of the
suspect and the suspect looked right at him. They both saw him for a period of twenty to thirty
seconds or more, so it was not a quick glance. The witnesses actually focused on the suspect
with the expressed intent of making sure they could identify him in the future. Both witnesses
were very clear in their identification at the preliminary hearing and indicated they were likewise
mentally acute at the scene. They identified the suspect to the officer and were consistent in their
identification thereafter. The event was an unusual one, drawing attention to the suspect. Of
course, their identification was corroborated by the passenger in the stolen car who accompanied
defendant and was a good enough acquaintance to know his name.

B. THE INITIAL PHOTO IDENTIFICATION
The reasonableness of use of photos to obtain identification must be considered "in light
of the totality of the circumstances." Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383, 88 S.Ct. 967,
970 (1968). Further, in cases where police use a photograph in attempting to apprehend a
suspect after a crime, "despite the hazards of initial identification by photograph, this procedure
has been used widely and effectively in criminal law enforcement from the standpoint of both
apprehending offenders and of sparing innocent suspects the ignominy of arrest by allowing
eyewitnesses to exonerate them through scrutiny of photographs." Id. at 384.
Here, Officer Huff heard from an apparent acquaintance of defendant that defendant was
driving the stolen vehicle when it crashed, spectacularly the Court might add, at the gas station.
The driver may have risked a serious fire or explosion and bystander deaths by crashing at a high
speed in the area of the gas pumps. Huff was justified in trying to verify defendant was indeed
the driver and apprehend him as quickly as possible. Using all means at his disposal, and
verifying the fortunately obtained photo with the witnesses allowed him to do this. He was thus
able to avoid arresting an innocent suspect, and protect the public from similar acts by defendant
in the form of stealing another car in his flight and again putting the public at fatal risk. A person
such as defendant could avoid such a purported, but legally distorted, constitutional concern he
is now expressing by not leaving the scene of an accident. The law requires drivers in accidents
3

to stay at the scene.
Actually, the facts in this case are similar to those in Simmons, supra, where the suspect
fled the scene and was still at large, making it necessary for police to determine quickly whether
they were on the right track and looking for the right person. Officer Hufrs actions were
necessary and did not violate defendant's rights to due process which Defendant was actively
engaged in compromising by fleeing. Under defendant's theory, police could never show a
single photo to eyewitnesses in an attempt to solve a recently committed crime when time is of
the essence, and there is no time to prepare a photo lineup because the suspect is at large and
fleeing. The Constitution surely did not contemplate putting the public at physical risk in the
manner suggested by defendant, as Simmons confinns.
At the scene of the crime, the witnesses matched defendant's picture to someone they had
seen minutes before. They made it a point to look at his face when he got out of the car and took
off. It was a strong identification, tantamount to a situation where the police would have brought
him back a few minutes later and asked, "is this the guy?" The Court cannot see an
unconstitutional risk of taint. Under the facts of this case, defendant's theory would require
virtually any prior look at a suspect to be deemed unreliable and an identification-tainting
occurrence.
C. THE PHOTO LINEUP
The above analysis largely renders moot defendant's argument that the initial witness
photo identification tainted the subsequent photo lineup. The on-scene identification was
characterized by non-ambiguity and strength of the identification.
However, following filing of his motion to suppress, defendant raised another issue
attacking the reliability of the photo lineup itself. The Court will thus address whether the photo
array was unreliable. It is not clear to the Court why there was a need for photo lineup, ten
months after the event, when there were already strong eyewitness identifications. The Court in
any event is inclined to exclude the photo lineup at trial because it is cumulative to much
stronger identifications.

However, defendant now argues that the pretrial photo identification procedure used by
Officer Huff was impermissibly suggestive in its own right, even without reference to the photo
4
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identification at the scene, and will taint any in-court identification by the witnesses. Thus, the
Court will evaluate the impact of the lineup in light of all the surrounding circumstances to see if
the photo array emphasized defendant's photo over the others, State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105,
1111 (Utah 1994) Lopez, and whether the witnesses have been poisoned beyond repair as a result.
Regarding the lineup itself, as noted, the trial court is the gatekeeper to detennine whether
identification information is sufficient to be presented to the jury. State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45,
~

30, 48 P.3d 953,963. See also State v. Guzman, 2004 UT App 211,118, 95 P.3d 302,307.

The Court must determine, given the totality of the circumstances, whether a pretrial photo
identification procedure used by law enforcement was "so impennissibly suggestive as to give rise
to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105,
1111 (Uta 1994) (quoting State v. Thamer, 777 P.2d432, 435 (Utahl 989) (citing Simmons v.
United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383 (1968))). If the photo array was impermissibly suggestive, a

subsequent in-court identification may still be admissible, but it "must be based on [an] untainted,
independent foundation to be reliable." Lopez, 886 P.2d at 1111 (quoting Thamer, 777 P.2d at
435.

Although defendant has an Hispanic surname, like many people of Latino ancestry he is
fairly light complected. The photos Huff assembled were all photos of males with light
complexions, although three appear lighter than defendant. Defendant has a goatee, although it is
not clear whether he had a goatee on the day of the crime.

He is balding. Three of the other

photographed males had goatees, the other two appear to have some facial hair and four out of the
five are balding. Defendant's photo was neither first nor last in the group. Defendant is the only
one wearing a "wife-beater" shirt, to use the vernacular of his generation, but the others have on a
variety of shirts, including one with a white t-shirt. Defendant's shirt is not a reason to single him
out-it is just different but all the other candidates' shirts are different. This is not the safest lineup
the Court has ever seen. However, while not all in the photographs had characteristics identical to
defendant, the Court cannot say the lineup was impermissibly suggestive.
Even if it was impermissibly suggestive, the Court concludes in-court identifications by
the two witnesses will not only have an untainted independent foundation for reliability, as
discussed in the strength of the on-scene identifications described ante, but a strong foundation as
5

outlined above. Those identifications at the scene may be admitted as exceptions to the hearsay
rule under Rule 80l(d)(l)(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence as well. (See also, State v. Vazquez,
451 P.2d 786, 787 (Utah 1969). Still, as noted, the Court is inclined to exclude the photo
identification Ii"neup itself as cumulative and unnecessary given the strength of the other
eyewitness evidence and the name identification by defendant's confederate at the scene under a
variety of evidentiary rules.
WHEREFORE IT IS ORDERED: The Motion to Suppress Eyewitness Identification is
denied. However, the photo lineup evidence will likely be excluded at trial as cumulative,
although it will be necessary for the Court to evaluate it in light of the other evidence actually
presented.
DATED this 4th day of September, 2014.
BY THE COURT
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STi\TE OF UTAH
-:.JTAH COUNTY

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL D!STRICT COURT
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF ~TAH

ORIGINAL

}

STATE OF UTAH,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

) Case No. 141400333 FS

vs.

SANTIAGO APONTE,

______________
Defendant.

)
)
)
)

)

Oral Argument
Electrcnically Recorded on
December 15, 2014

BEFORE:

THE HONORABLS SPJ•1UEL MCVEY

Fo~rth Dist=ict Court Judge

APPEARANCES
For the State:

Chad E. Grunander
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
100 East Center Street
Suite 2100

Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone:
For the Defendant:

( 801) 851-8026

Spencer A. Thomas
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDERS
51 South University Avenue
Suite 206
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone: (801) 852-1070

FILED
Transcribed by: Wendy Haws, CCT

UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

1771 South Califo~nia Aven~e
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801) 3i7-2927

JUL 1 6 2015
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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on December 15, 2014)

3

MR. THOMAS: Your Honor, could we also call No. 64 on

4

the calendar, Santiago Aponte.

5

THE COURT: Mr. Aponte, No. 64.

6

MR. TH0,'1A.S: Your Honor, I have not had contact. with

7

him since the last hearing.

I have not seen him.

8

today for oral arguments on a 404(b) motion.

9

the Court would like to go forward on that.

We're set

I don't know if

10

THE COURT: Yes.

11

MR. THOMAS: We have trial set 'ilednesday and Thursday.

12

THE COURT: Yes, I would like to go forwa~d, so let me

13

just pull this up.

14

15

MR. TH0!'1A.S: Excuse me one sec.
hall jJst to make sure.
,,.,,.., COURT:
- nc,
Sure, okay.

16

17

Let me look in the

Aponte in the jail, do we?

Let's see, we don't have

Aponte, A-p-o-n-t-e?

18

COURT BAILIFF: No, your Honor.

19

THE COURT: Okay.

20

proceed on these, then.

21

here so

22

All right, well, let's go ahead and

Let me just pull up your opposition

we did look at that last week, but okay.
MR. THOMAS: Your Honor, the State is seeking to

23

incroduce evidence under Utah Rule of Svidence 404{b), prior

24

acts.

25

THE COURT: Okay, before you continue, did you want to
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1

introduce all of these wrecks, or did you

2
3

MR. GRUNANDER: Ne, what I wanted to introduce, Judge,
and we've sort of narrowed this down --

4

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

5

MR. GRUNANDER: -- in the event that the Court allows

6

admission cf this evidence.

7

two other acts.

He had two -- he had one -- well,

8

THE COURT: Yeah.

9

MR. GRUNANDER: O~e was prior to, approximately elevEn

10

months.

11

after.

12

pleas on both cases.

13

guilty, one was no contes~. If you actually go to the hearings,

14

though, they're both no contest pleas.

15

The other one was about three or four weeks, I think,
That's when the events occurred.

He entered no contest

On the Court's record it shows one was

What I would like to introduce is a copy-- a certified

16

copy of the convicticns only on the attemp-:ed evading charge.

17

?here's some with other charges that would be redacted, as well

18

as the statement that was given by the prosecutor Tim Taylor in

19

Court of the facts to support the convictions.

20

Mr. Thomas and I have talked, and I think we have an

21

agreement if the Court were to allow it, whereby I've had it

22

transcribed, and we would just read into the record facts to

23

support those convictions, and add one sentence to the second

24

case that indicates chat law enforcement used an interview with

25

a front seat passenger and a 1. i r.eup t.o identify P.ponte as the
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1

driver in that case.

2

THE COURT: Okay.

3

MR. GRUNANDER: That's what I'm seeking to introduce.

4

THE COURT: Then one other questicn.

We got those

5

medical records when he missed Court on the 23 rd or 24 t.h of

6

November that showed he was in the emergency room for another

7

-- for injuries from another car crash.

8

about that, if he was the driver or anything like that?

9

MR. GRUNANDER: You know, I do not know, your Honor.

10
11

12

We don't know anything

THE COURT: Okay, just wondering.

sorry.

Okay.

All right,

Go ahead, Mr. Thomas.
MR. THOMAS: So, your Honor, that is a correct repre-

13

sentation of what we have discussed. My objection still follows

14

what is written in my argument.

15

has cited to State v. Hildreth where it sets out a list of

16

factors when it looks at the prejudicial effect.

17

I -- under 404(b) the State

The list of factors are the strength of the evidence

18

of the other bad acts, the similarities between the charged

19

offer.ses, the intervals of times that have elapsed, the need

20

for the evidence, and the efficiency of alte=nate proof.

21

finally the degree which the evidence would rouse the jury to

22

overmaster hostility.

Then

23

My argument simply is the crime -- the heaviest crime

24

is not related in any way to the either to the other offenses.

25

It is a theft crime.

None of the other offenses that would be
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1

brought in would relate to a theft. It would simply be relating

2

to the evading.

3

THE COURT: Now, I thought that's what we had here, was

4

an evading.

5

the witness wasn't available.

6
7

That they weren't proceeding on the theft because

MR. GRUNANDER: That's not true.
on

We're not proceeding

(inaudible).

8

THE COURT: Yeah.

9

MR. THOMAS: It sounds like since I've written that

10

I've come to that understanding

11

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

12

MR. THOMAS: -- but regardless of the fact,

I -chink

13

there's also a huge issue with prejudicial effect of the need

14

for evidence because here they're seeking to identify -- or

15

use it for identity purposes.

16

introduce three witnesses that will testify; two eyewitnesses

17

and the passenger of the vehicle who they are attempting to

18

have testify.

19

The State is also seeking to

I think with those three witnesses there is plenty

20

of evidence in which that the State can get their point across

21

and to show the identity.

22

two offenses wiil essentially pre-determine the jury's mind

23

and prejudice my client to where they will convict not on the

24

current offense, but o~ the two prior offenses which he did

25

plead no CQntest to.

I think allowing in these additional
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1
2
3

4
5

6

THE COURT: But your client would place his identity an
issue in this case, correct?
MR. THOMAS: That's been -- that's been the No. 1 focus
of Lhis is identity.

THE COURT: Okay.

All right, thank you.

All right.

Mr. Grunander.

7

MR. GRUNANDER: Yes, Judge.

8

to clarify a couple of things in the motion.

9

one of the cases talks -- certainly identity is the primary

10

issue here.

11

this information in.

12

We've used this -- just
I referred to

That would be the primary purpose for bringing

I also referred to motive, because of st~teme~ts

13

with respect to I think immigration.· He was rur.ning because

14

of potential immigration consequences.

15

that portion. We would not be seeking to introduce that inform-

16

ation simply going on a factual statement to support the pleas.

17

I would move to strike

Closely related to identity, and it also touches on

18

the absence -- on the absence cf mistake for an accident is the

19

Verde case when it talks about the doctrine of chances.

20

refer briefly to the Verde case in my pleading, but I think

21

that that's a significant approach because under the doctrine

22

of chances, I just ~anted ~o briefly read just a couple of

23

things that Justice Lee refers to when he's talking about the

24

doctrine of chances.

25

I did

He says, "In some circumstances evidence of prior
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1

misconduct can be relevant under the so-called doctrine of

2

chances.

3

the objective improbability of ~he same rare misfortune be-

4

falling one individual over and over.

5

that here.

6
7

THE

COURT: How many

that were in that

--

I think we would have

do you remember how many priors

in that Verde case·?

8

MR. GRUNANDER: In this case --

9

THE COURT: Were there just two or were there

--

--

10

MR. GRUN.zi..NDER:

11

THE COURT: Okay, it's been a while since I looked at

12
r~
. J.

It is a theory of logical relevance that rests on

13

I believe 'there were j'..lst two.

that, so
MR. GRUNANDER: He goes onto

14

test for this, which I'll refe~ to.

15

because the more you have

and they lay out the
It touches on that,

16

THE COURT: Right.

17

MR. GRUNANDER: -- obviously the more relevant that

18

approach is; but first is materiality.

19

in question, and we certainly have a question of identity here.

20

Second is the similarity.

21

of a pattern.

22

"must be roughly similar to the charged crime.H

23

The issue has to be

e talks about how it's not evidence

It doesn't have to be that strong, but he says

We certainly have a rough similarity here, given the

24

evading, the high speed chase, the violation of the traffic

25

laws; but most. importantly in each case, when law enforcement
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1

come upon the vehicle, Mr. Aponte's outside of it.

2

the one case and was identified by a front seat passenger like

3

what we have here, and then later by use of a lineup like what

4

we have here.

5

He fled in

The other one it appears he was attempting to flee,

6

but he was found outside the vehicle lying on the grass.

He

7

was intoxicated at that point.

8

stricken from the statement if this were allowed any evidence

9

that he smelled of alcohol or his BAC.

On that issue the State has

10

The third standard is independence.

11

must be independent of the others, which we have here.

12

is the frequency.

13

crime or suffered an unusual loss more frequently than the

14

typical person endures such losses accidentally.

15

Each accusation
Fourth

The defendant must have been accused of the

That's where I think it's important to refer exactly

16

to what Justice Lee says.

17

the low baseline probability that a man would take a horse by

18

mistake or that an innocent person would be falsely accused of

19

sexual assault," or he cites to other examples.

20

He says, "This reasoning starts with

The second step is the analysis considers the effect

21

on these already low probabilities of additional similar occur-

22

rences.

23

probability of coincidence decreases, and the likelihood that

24

the defendant committed one or more of the actions increases.

25

Then it goes on to talk about how this is not propensity

As the number of improbable occurrences increases, the
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1

evidence because it's tied directly to a law of probabilities.

2

So I think thac that goes to identity.

3

T

think it also goes to the issue of primarily these

4

two witnesses, citizen witnesses that identified them on a

5

show-up picture and then later a lineup in that we would

6

presumably be able to identify him in Court, that there's

7

a lack of accident or miscake that they're identifying him,

8

because he's actually agreed, or agreed at least not to contest

9

prior events that he's been convicted of.

10

At the entry of plea, it's interesting, Judge Howard

11

asked them, "Is that a fair statement of the conduct to support

12

the pleas?" and the answer is "Yes, it is."

13

"I'm agreeing not ~o contest che charges;" but ~hat's what was

14

stat:ed in Court.

15

It wasn't just,

So I think it's offered for a legitimate purpose to

16

show identity, which is not propensity based.

17

very, very relevant, and! don't think that the potential for

18

unfair prejudice outweighs the probative value here because

19

we'

20

which is correct.

21

re looking at

I think it's

Mr. Thomas calks about three witnesses,

We have Rebecca Robertson, who is a co-defendant, who

22

we hope to get her at trial, will be testifying.

23

subpoenaed.

24

the point of view of her criminal record, several felcnies.

25

She's been to prison before.

She has been

She's going to be a very impeachable witness from
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1

Then we have two eyewitnesses that identified him.

2

We have a long instruction that speaks to the identification,

3

the different factors involved, but it's problematic, and the

4

Courts have found it's not the most reliable all the time.

5

So that is the crux here.

6

an independent approach co proving the case.

7

necessary because it doesn't carry the same liabilities or

8

problems that eyewitness testimony does, or a very impeachable

9

witness like Ms. Robertson.

This kind of evidence is
I think it's

So for those reasons I think the

10

State needs it as well, and it satisfies the Shickles factors

11

as well as the Verde case on a doctrine of chances approach.

12

THE COURT: So you would be offering it for motive --

13

MR. GRUNANDER: Identity and --

14

THE COURT: --and setting aside the doctrine of chances

15
16

how does this show identity again?
MR. GRUNANDER: We show identity because it's similar

17

in nature to what -- h~ has coITl~itted two prio~ offenses, if

18

you will, that are similar in nature to this.

19

the doctrine of chances.

20

he's done this twice before, the law of probabilities would

21

suggest it's not an accident.

22

That works with

That's showing identity, because if

THE COURT: Right, but I mean, I thought you were making

23

an independent a~gument also that under 404(b) it should come

24

in so it's o~tside the -- the doctrine of chances, as I under-

25

stand it, is outside 404 (b), because it's not propensity based.
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1

So --

2

MR. GRUNANDER: That -- that --

3

THE COURT: -- although you still have to do a 403

4

analysis, but --

5

MR. GRUNANDER: Sure.

6

THE COURT: -- but how would it show

7

MR. GRUNANDER: It's the idea --

8

THE COURT: -- so I'm wondering if you had an inde --

9

so let's say, for example, that {inaudible) was never issued.

10

Would there be --

11

MR. GRUNANDER: If what was never an issue, I'm sorry?

12

THE COURT: If that case was never issued.

13

MR. GRUNANDER: Okay.

14

THE COURT: So let's suppose that we're not dealing

15

with that.

16

would that

17

that it shows identity under 404(b), under the literal language

18

of 404(b)?

19

Would 404{b) also, you know, just as it's written,
would you also be stati~g that there's an id --

MR. GRUNANDER: Yes, beca~se of the similar nature of

20

the crimes.

21

know, when I think of an MO I think of maybe a homicide where

22

you leave behind a calling card or --

It shows-- I don't know that it shows an MO.

You,

23

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

24

MR. GRUNANOER: -- a certain i~jury en the individual,

25

but it's very similar in nature to the other crimes.

That
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1

would go to identity.

2

intent.

3

to show intent because her.ad pled not guilty.

4

didn't like that because the defense had stipulated to the

5

intent part.

You know, the Verde case turned on

There the State wanted to bring the information in
The Court

6

Here we have -- we have nothing.

7

THE COURT: Right.

8

MR. GRUNANDER: We have a complete "I didn't do it." So

9

intent is relevant.

You know, the motive to do it is relevant.

10

His capacity -- I mean -- I mean, it's a fine line and we have

il

to instruct the jury on the exact purpose of it, but --

12

THE COURT: Okay.

13

MR. GRUNANDER: -- there's a number of factors.

I

14

think it applies primarily identity, and then I think this law

15

of probabilities with respect to doctrine of chances.

16

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

17

MR. GRUNANDER: Excuse me,

18

THE COURT: -- Mr. Thomas, I'm sorry.

19

MR. GRUNANDER: And one more --

20

THE COURT: Yes.

21

MR. GRUNANDER: -- being lack of accident or mistake

All right, Mr. Spencer

I'm sorry.

22

on the part of the witnesses.

23

language contained in 404(b), but it also applies to the

24

doctrine of chances

25

That would directly -- that's

THE COURT: Okay.
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1

MR. GRUNANDER: -- under Justice Lee's analysis.

2

THE COURT: Thank you.

3

MR. THOMAS: Your Honor, I still think the reality of

4

the situation that we're looking at is the prejudicial effect

5

that it will have on a jury, whether it will rise to the level

6

that it influences them in such a way that they are not making

7

decisions based on the facts of the case themselves.

8
9

Okay, Mr. Thomas.

What we're looking at here is we're looking at two
prior no context please to similar offenses, and they're

10

looking at a similar of:ense here.

11

more than likely this will have a huge impact and it will be

12

unfairly prej~dicial.

13

The reality is, is that

I think the case law goes through it fairly clear that

14

if there are other ways to do that there should be a means

15

resolve this without ente=ing this prejudicial inforffiation.

16

Here, where the State has these three witnesses lined up; one

17

that was passenger to the vehicle.

18

issues, but they were passenger to the vehicle

1::0

Yeah, there are credibility

19

THE COURT: Hopefully she'll come.

20

MR. THOMAS: -- and two, independent eyewitnesses

21

that have testified, and you have heard their testimony in

22

the preliminary hearing and the -- in the prior evidentiary

23

hearing that we had regarding the previous motion will testify

24

and point out in Court based on the ruling of the Court that my

25

client was che driver of the vehicle.
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1

I think this additional information will do nothing

2

more than prejudice the -- prejudice the facts of this case to

3

where they wcn't look independently at the facts.

4

look independently at the witnesses.

5

the evidence as what the witnesses are telling them.

6

it will simply rise to that level where they will convict based

7

on a prior conviction.

8
9

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

They won't

They won't scrutinize
I think

Okay, under Rule 404(b),

first we have to see whether the evidence is potentially

10

admissible to prove a non-character -- for a non-character

11

purpose.

12

assuming that at least initially it would be admissible to

13

show intent, in other words what his intent was in leaving

14

the area.

15

mistake or accident, in tha.t he wasn't just leaving because he

16

didn't know better.

17

was doing.

18

In this case it would be admissible to show intent,

It would show his

it would show an absence of

It would also show knowledge about what he

I'm not sure about the-- I'm having a hard time making

19

the bridge from prior similar incidents to identity.

20

identity is an issue here, I'm having a difficult time with

21

that.

22

least under this theory.

23

Although

So I wouldn't allow it to show identity necessarily, at

Then so

so then we also have to look at Rule 403.

24

That is whether the probative nature of this is substantially

25

outweighed by its prejudicial character; and in doing that we
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1

look at the factors under State vs. Shickles, and we look at

2

several factors such as the strength of the evidence as to the

3

cornmission of the -- of the misconduct and the -- of the other

4

misconduct, or the incidents.

5

actually have him admitting to it.

6

but in the criminal law that's essentially an admission.

7

acknowledging that the evidence was there.

8
9

Well, here we do have -- we
They're no context pleas,

We also have similarities between the crimes.

He's

They

a~e very similar in the sense that he's running away from the

10

vehicles.

11

because they involve crashing in different places and the

12

violence of the crashes; but nonetheless, they're not so

13

similar, I don't believe, that it would be prejudicial for

14

this co come in.

15

substantially outweigh the -- the macerial nature of it, the

16

probative nature of it.

17

The circumstances are not that similar, though,

At least the prejudicial nature of it would

The interval

v-

time ~hat's elapsed between the crimes.

18

Well, it's just been within the last year or two.

19

an extensive, so it's not remote evidence.

20

alternative proof.

21

one problematic witness thac was the passenger.

22

the other two witnesses who~ the defense is contesting their

23

identification.

24
25

The efficacy of

In this case we have witnesses.

So the alternate
shut.

So it's not

We have

Then we have

alternative proof is not open and

So mistakes should be allowed to aug~ent that evidence;
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1

and the degree to which the evidence will rouse the jury to

2

overmastering hostility.

3

necessarily.

4

the nature of the offense would rouse the jury to overmastering

5

hostility.

6

consider.

This is not a crime against a person,

It's essentially an escape.

I don't believe that

Rather, i~ wouid be something that the jury would

Sc based on that I do not believe that I could say

7

8

that the probative nature of the evidence is substantially

9

outweighed by its prejudicial character.

Also, under the

10

Verde case we do have this doctrine of chances idea that the

11

Supreme Court has brought in that I guess you could call it

12

"good" propensity evidence, I don't know, rather than "bad"

13

propensity evidence.

14

Nonetheless, it demonstrates ~hat, okay, this is our

15

-- this is the third time that I've gotten in a wreck and I've

16

run away.

17

something like that are quite remote; and I believe that the

18

evidence would also come in under that case, as well as going

19

through the Shickles factors for the same things.

20

The chances of t~at being a mistake or accident or

It would come in for purposes of showing identity,

21

because it shows that what the witnesses observed was something

22

that this person would not do by accident.

23

would come in under that that evi -- under that theory as well.

24

25

So I think that it

So I'm going to allow the State to introduce this
evidence with the restrictions that have been outlined by
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1

Mr. Grunander.

2

that minimizes -- that minimizes even more the danger of unfair

3

prejudice.

4

can't be unfairly prejudicial, and they can't -- we have --

5

the prejudice has to be higher than -- when you're weighing

6

it against the material nature.

7

that will be allowed, and that will be che ruling of the Court.

The way that he's going to present it I think

You know, things can be prejudicial.

8

MR. THOMAS: Your Honor

9

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

10
11

So we'll allow it in.

So

MR. THOMAS: Your P.onor, are you also planning on dcing
a limiting instruction with regard to that?

12

13

They just

I have filed

THE COURT: Yeah, we can do a limiting instruction
saying

14

~R. THOM.ll.S: I have filed that.

15

THE COURT: Yeah, we can say this is what the evidence

16

can be used for; and so we can definitely do that.

17
18

Also --

MR. GRUNANDER: I think Counsel and I can p~obably work

on a stipulation of the language.

19

THE COURT: Yeah, that would be great.

20

MR. THOMAS: Yeah.

21

THE COURT: Now, we have this sst to go to trial in two

22

days.

23

in the jail.

24

hospitals and make sure he's not there, or in the next day or

25

two.

We don't know where Mr. Aponte is.

He's obviously not

We're going to have to have somebody contact the

If -- co~ld you have a member of your staff contact Utah
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1

Valley up to

2

MR. THO!"".tAS: We coul.d do that.

3

THE COURT: -- probably up to American Fork?

4

MR. GRUNANDER: I wanted to kind of seek the Court's

5

direction a little bit on this.

6

forward on this.

7

but in the event that we're not able to find him, we don't know

8

where he's at, obviously as it's been talked about today, one

9

of the State's pieces of evidence here, when it comes to eye-

You know, we want to move

One of -- and maybe I'm forecasting too much,

10

witness identification, the jury's going to be instructed on

11

consistency of the identifications over time.

12

We have one on the night in question that they used a

13

photograph and said, "Yes, that's him" when they were shown a

14

photograph.

15

months later that they said, "That's him" from the lineup.

16

There was some question I think at our evidentiary hearing as

17

to whether or not the Court was going to allow chat in.

18

We had a lineup that was a few months

THE COURT: Right.

We'll take a look at that.

several

I --

19

I thought you had some -- you had sufficient evidence of the

20

identification that night.

21

in time.

It was a -- it was very proximate

22

MR. GRUNANDER: It was.

23

THE COURT: They had a photograph.

The witness id --

24

matched him to the photograph.

25

ation for him being the one in the photograph, it looked to me.

The officer can lay a found-
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1

So --

2

MR. GRUNANDER: Sure.

3

THE COURT: -- whether he's --

4

MR. GRUNANDER: The question would be if he's not here

5

in ~rial, and the witness doesn't -- isn't able to say, "Yeah,

6

I see the driver.

7

purpose, I don't want to handcuff myself to a degree where the

8

jury's sort of just throwing their hands up in the air with

9

what to do because he's not present here.

He's sitting right there," for the jury's

10

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

11

MR. GRUNANDER: So my question is do we move forward

12

13
14

without him?
THE COURT: Well, I would intend to move forward in
absentia if he's unwilling to show up.

15

MR. GRUNAN~ER: Uh-huh. -

16

THE COURT: I think that there's evidence that could

17

potentially produce a conviction, in fact, pretty good evidence

18

based on what observations were that evening, and based on the

19

statement of the co-defendant about who it was.

20

MR. GRUNANDER: Sure.

21

THE COURT: Which is admissible as a prior statement

22

when someone is -- has identified some -- has identified some-

23

body, under Rule 801, I think.

So --

24

MR. GRUNANDER: As an exception to hearsay (inaudible).

25

THE COURT: -- as an exception to -- well, it's not
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1

hearsay.

2

to worry abou~ hearsay in that circumstance, and the officer

3

can identify that statement, if she chooses not to show up.

4

Although you could -- we could also make sure that she comes,

5

if we want to -- I mean,

6

within the last few weeks.

7
8

It's actually -- it's actually you don't even have

~

know she's around.

I've seen her

MR. GRUNANDER: I think she was released from jail.

I

believe it was Thursday we had her subpoenaed.

9

THE COURT: Okay.

10

MR. GRUNANDER: So -- but we had --

11

THE COURT: Well, might need to send somebody

12

MR. GRUNANDER: -- I've entertained --

13

THE COURT: -- out to get her to make sure she comes,

14

but -- make sure she's here in a sobe~ state, but --

15

MR. GRUNANDER: Sure.

16

THE COURT: -- yeah, but anyway.

17

MR. GRUNANDER: Okay.

18

MR. THOMAS: You.:::: Honor, it was the intent of the

19

defense to call the defendant, you know, in order to --

20

THE COURT: Right.

21

MR. THOMAS: -- to defend adequately against this

22

defense.

23

THE COURT: Uh-huh, yeah.

24

MR. THOMAS: If t.he State -- if it's the Court's intent

25

to go forward and try him in absentia, that essentially creates
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1

a very problematic case for me, to which I cannot -- you know,

2

I'm pretty much handcuffed to --

3

THE COURT: Right, and you

4

MR. THOMAS: -- cross examinat.ion.

5

THE COURT: -- but the point is, you have not put your-

6

self in that situation; Mr. Aponte has.

7

set this.

8

before.

9

This last time when he was supposedly in the hospital and the

He was here when we

We've talked about this before.

He's missed Court

He's made excuses and we've let him off the hook.

10

record shows that he was in the hospital albeit after he was

11

supposed to be here at Court by an hour or two.

12

know if somebody got a hold of him and he rushed over to the

13

hospital, because they didn't find anything wrong with him,

14

but he -- it's his fault, it's not yours, if he doesn't show

15

up, okay?

16

MR. THOMAS: I understand.

17

THE

18

MR. THOMAS:

19

20

So I don't

I'm just

COURT: But I recognize -- yeah.
I've got to advocate for my client.

I've got -co -THE COURT: I understand that; but again, it's nothing

21

that you had any control over.

22

here, he's waived all kinds of rights.

23

Court simply can't put up with somebody who's unwill -- who

24

hears when they're supposed to be at trial, and doesn't appear.

25

By the way, would the State request a warrant for Mr. Aponte?

So if he -- if he doesn't come
It's his problem.

The
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1

MR. GRUNANDER: Yes, Judge.

2

THE COURT: All right, we'll authorize a non-bailable

3

warrant.

4

dressed out.

5

know if it fits him.

6

some clothes to wear if he's picked up and put in jail, which

7

would solve a lot of problems in this case.

8

okay, anything else, then?

9

on Wednesday.

Now, if he's put in jail, we still have to have him
So we have some clothing downstairs, but I don't

So we'll have to make sure that he has

So, anyway

Otherwise we'll get going at 8:30

10

MR. GRUNANDER: We'll be here.

11

MR. THOM.AS: Okay, thank you, Judge.

12

THE COURT: Thank you.

13

(Hearing concluded)
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AddendumC

Addendu1n C

Utah R. Evid. 404. Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct; Exceptions; Other Crimes
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person1s character or a trait of
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of
character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by the accused and admitted
under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the accused offered
by the prosecution;
(2) Character of alleged victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the
alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut
the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged
victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in
Rules 607,608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution
in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during
trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any
such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
(c) Evidence of similar crimes in child molestation cases.
(1) In a criminal case in which the accused is charged with child molestation,
evidence of the commission of other acts of child molestation may be admissible
to prove a propensity to commit the crime charged provided that the prosecution
in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during
trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any
such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
(2) For purposes of this rule "child molestation" means an act committed in
relation to a child under the age of 14 which would, if committed in this state, be a
sexual offense or an attempt to commit a sexual offense.
(3) Rule 404(c) does not limit the admissibility of evidence otherwise admissible under Rule 404(a), 404(b), or any other rule of evidence.

